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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of China, scholars once again face great questions in
global history—questions about the rise of the West, but also its potential
relative decline.1 What role has law played in the rise and fall of global
powers? There are, indeed, scholars who believe that legal institutions
can determine the economic fate of civilizations and societies.2 Many have
focused in particular on the role of property rights in England’s rise to
global preeminence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,3 an issue
that captured academic attention as early as Max Weber and continues to
do so today.4 This Article sheds new light on this debate by focusing on

1. On the “rise of the West,” see generally WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE RISE OF
THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY (1963); E. L. JONES, THE EUROPEAN
MIRACLE: ENVIRONMENTS, ECONOMIES AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE AND
ASIA (2d ed. 1981); and DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS:
WHY SOME ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR (1998). For a discussion on potential
decline, see IAN MORRIS, WHY THE WEST RULES—FOR NOW: THE PATTERNS OF HISTORY,
AND WHAT THEY REVEAL ABOUT THE FUTURE (2010). China’s rise poses a significant
challenge to theories of economic development established on the “rise of the west”
presumption. See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the
Implications of Chinese Growth For Law And Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 551 (2009); Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights
Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003); Tom Ginsburg, Does
Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 829 (2000).
2. See generally TIMUR KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW
HELD BACK THE MIDDLE EAST (2011); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Rafael
La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. OF POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
For a more critical perspective, see Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative
Law and Economics?, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 197 (2009); Upham, supra note 1; see, e.g.,
Clarke, supra note 1, at 89–90; David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in SelfEstrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the
United States, WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1075–76 (1974). For a summary of this considerable
interdisciplinary literature, see Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship
Between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 895–
96 (2008).
3. For traditional statements on the English divergence, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH
& ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY 1–18 (1973); E.A. WRIGLEY, POVERTY, PROGRESS AND POPULATION 44–60
(2004). A more recent view is that divergence between England and China did not occur
until the nineteenth century. See, e.g., KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE:
EUROPE, CHINA, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 31 (2000). For a
reasonably comprehensive survey of the relevant literature, see POMERANZ, supra, at 3–
15, 31.
4. The relevant literature is vast. See, e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954); NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 3, at 1–8; THE
BRENNER DEBATE 10–63 (T.H. Aston & C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1985); Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional
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one of the great stories of relative decline in global history: The decline
of China from one of the richest and most powerful countries in the
sixteenth century to one overwhelmed by European, particularly English,
economic and military superiority in the nineteenth.5
In recent years, the economic history field has undergone a sea change:
Numerous senior historians who previously focused only on Europe
have shifted their attention to global comparisons, particularly between
Northwestern Europe and Eastern China.6 The break from traditional
Eurocentrism is commendable in itself, but more importantly, it has
brought well-deserved attention to the dramatic ethno-cultural and political
consequences of the Sino-English economic divergence.7 Whereas
Europeans marveled at China’s social and economic complexity even in
the late seventeenth century,8 by the Opium War, England’s economic
strength was undeniably superior. The gap continued to grow for a century,
as China was not able to successfully industrialize until the Communist
era.9 The economic divergence had massive psychological and material
consequences: Chinese anguish over her persistent industrial and military
ineptitude contributed heavily to the century-long stretch of self-doubt
and cultural chaos that followed, starting with the crumbling of its
traditional value-system and ending with the Communist revolution.10
Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 546, 546–72 (2005); CHARLES I.
JONES, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 121 (2d ed., 2002).
5. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 11–12.
6. Brenner, for example, moved from his focus on the Anglo-French comparison
to the Anglo-Chinese comparison, see THE BRENNER DEBATE supra note 4; and Robert
Brenner & Christopher Isett, England’s Divergence from China’s Yangtze Delta:
Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development, 61 J. ASIAN STUD.
609 (2002). Robert Allen and Joel Mokyr have also adopted a more global perspective
that pays much attention to China. See generally ROBERT C. ALLEN, THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); Joel Mokyr, Why Was the Industrial
Revolution a European Phenomenon?, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 27 (2003).
7. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 3–15.
8. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE CHAN’S GREAT CONTINENT: CHINA IN WESTERN
MINDS 19–51 (1998).
9. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 229, 239 (setting the date of divergence in the
early nineteenth century).
10. The psychological and ideological damage inflicted by the perception of
material weakness is a prevalent theme in the modern Chinese history field. See, e.g.,
MARY CLABOUGH WRIGHT, THE LAST STAND OF CHINESE CONSERVATISM: THE T’UNGCHIH RESTORATION, 1862–1874, at 5–7 (1957); BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, IN SEARCH OF
WEALTH AND POWER: YEN FU AND THE WEST 15, 18, 247 (1964); 1 JOHN KING FAIRBANK,
TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST: THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS,
1842–1854 (1953); JOSEPH R. LEVENSON, CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE: A
TRILOGY (1968). It is highly questionable, however, whether China’s modern intellectual
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The causes of China’s relative decline are, however, hardly obvious.
In fact, recent scholarship has shown that England, the richest European
economy, and the “Chinese core” shared many fundamental economic
characteristics in the later eighteenth century: both possessed significant
urbanization and highly developed markets, allowing much of their rural
population to “produce for the market.”11 In both economies, households
and individuals displayed rational, interest-based decision-making.12
Finally, contrary to some influential assumptions, both societies recognized
the private ownership of property, both real and personal.13
These fundamental similarities make China’s relative decline all the
more intriguing, even as they narrow the range of viable explanations.
Despite this higher “standard of proof,” there are no shortage of candidates,
including, among many others. The peculiar nature of European science,14
China’s population growth,15 her lack of natural resources and foreign
trade,16 the “oriental despotism” of the Confucian state,17 the weakness
and cultural history was only a reaction against Western impact. WILLIAM T. ROWE,
CHINA’S LAST EMPIRE: THE GREAT QING 1–10 (2009). Some argue that the groundwork
for this reaction was laid by developments in Confucian thought going back to the
sixteenth century. See generally BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PHILOLOGY:
INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHANGE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1984).
11. On market integration for agricultural produce, textiles, and other personal
goods in the Chinese economic core, see, e.g., LILLIAN M. LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN
NORTH CHINA: STATE, MARKET, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE 1690S–1990S, at 113,
164–65, 196–220 (2007); LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN,
1620–1850, at 107–08 (1998); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NORTH CHINA 118–20 (1985); CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
35–99 (Thomas G. Rawski & Lillian M. Li eds., 1992). As POMERANZ, supra note 3, at
86–87, points out, market development in pre-1800 Western Europe does not seem more
advanced. On urbanization in China, a recent literature survey is Yu Tongyuan, Ming
Qing Zaoqi Gongyehua Shehuide Xingcheng yu Fazhan, 11 J. HIST. SCI. (2007): 41,
which argues that 20% of the Jiangnan population around 1700 was urban, while 30%
was non-agricultural. This is comparable with even the most optimistic estimates on
English urbanization in 1700, see infra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Lynda S. Bell, Farming, Sericulture, and Peasant Rationality in
Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth Century, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 207, 226–29, 232–39.
13. Private property had been the predominant form of land ownership in China
since the 10th Century. See Joseph P. McDermott, Charting Blank Spaces and Disputed
Regions: The Problem of Sung Land Tenure, 44 J. ASIAN STUD. 13, 13 (1984);
Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China, in CONTRACT AND
PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 17–18 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko &
Robert Gardella eds., 2004).
14. See Mokyr, supra note 6.
15. This is the basic thesis of JONES, supra note 1; MARK ELVIN, THE PATTERN OF
THE CHINESE PAST (1973); and ALLEN, supra note 6.
16. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 211–97.
17. The classic statement is attributable to KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL
DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957); see MAX WEBER, THE
RELIGION OF CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM (1951) (arguing that China’s Confucian
“religion” prevented the development of capitalism). For criticism on this, see Peter C.
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or negligence of the Qing state,18 and, of course, comparatively “inefficient”
property rights.19 In particular, the recent advent of the “new institutional
economics” has generated growing academic interest in the role of
property rights. Many have asked whether Chinese property rights were
historically different from English property rights and, if so, whether the
differences were economically significant.20 This would seem to invite
legal scholars to enter a debate that they have largely ignored—a curious
omission given their interest in issues of law and development.21 Situating
itself within the broader debate on Sino-English economic divergence,
this Article examines the relationship between property rights in land—
particularly land transaction norms—and agricultural development in
pre-industrial China and England.
Two basic presumptions shape its general approach. First, it is probably
impossible to draw a simple and direct casual relation between a certain
property norm and the general Sino-English economic divergence. The
logical leap seems unacceptably large. Instead, one must recognize the
precise social and economic conditions that the norms operate within,
and address seriously the intermediate outcomes that bridge the gap
between norm and general divergence. This Article, for example, accepts
prior arguments that the scarcity of managerial farming in China was
important to the eventual divergence, and then argues that property rights
can explain this scarcity. Second, the legal historian has an especially heavy
burden to simply present legal facts accurately. In light of previous

Perdue, China in the Early Modern World: Shortcuts, Myths and Realities, EDUCATION
ABOUT ASIA, June 1999.
18. See, e.g., RAMON H. MYERS, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, PAST AND PRESENT
(1980); R. BIN WONG, CHINA TRANSFORMED: HISTORICAL CHANGE AND THE LIMITS OF
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 76, 119 (1997); PETER C. PERDUE, CHINA MARCHES WEST: THE
QING CONQUEST OF CENTRAL EURASIA 548, 551, 565 (2005).
19. Scholars originally believed that China simply had no civil law. See DERK
BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 4 (1967); Shiga Shuzo, Qingdai
Susong Zhidu zhi Minshi Fayuan de Kaocha, in MING QING SHIQI DE MINSHI SHENPAN
YU MINJIAN QIYUE 54 (Wang Yaxin & Liang Zhiping eds., Wang Yanxin et al. trans.,
1998) (arguing that civil adjudication had no legal foundation). This led many European
historians to incorrectly assume that private property was unique to Europe. See
McDermott; Zelin supra note 13.
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 936, 946. Legal scholars have
recently incorporated China into this literature, see discussion at supra note 1, but have
so far focused almost exclusively on the contemporary Chinese economy. I have found
only one law review article published in the past decade that analyzes the “Great
Divergence”: Mokyr, supra note 6, at 49, 61–67. Mokyr is an economist.
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missteps—claims that rural land was inalienable in the Qing Dynasty,22
or that protection of private property was exclusive to Northwestern
Europe23— this obvious point bears repeating.
Within the wide-ranging debates on China’s relative decline, one of
the few points of general agreement is that, relative to England, China
lacked “managerial” or “capitalist” farming—defined as agricultural
production that relied more on employed labor than household labor.24
Most scholars would agree that household-level production dominated
Chinese agriculture until the Communist era. In comparison, by the
early-eighteenth century, English agriculture—including a large portion
of open-fields agriculture—was predominantly capitalist, whereas it had
been largely household-based in the sixteenth century.25
Historians traditionally believed that the higher labor productivity on
managerial farms created enormous agricultural surpluses that directly
stimulated English industrial growth.26 Likewise, they often saw China’s
relative lack of agricultural capitalism as a crippling liability that prevented
robust economic development.27 Although more recent scholarship
continues to agree that capitalist agriculture substantially boosted
productivity, some—particularly Robert Allen—have questioned whether
the increase was large enough to explain England’s overall economic
preeminence.28 The debate remains inconclusive.29 It is, however, a

22. See discussion infra pp. 147–48.
23. E.g., NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 3, at 1–8.
24. There is a detailed discussion of this infra Part I. See generally ELVIN, supra
note 15; LI WENZHI ET AL., MING QING SHIDAI DE NONGYE ZIBEN ZHUYI MENGYA WENTI
(1983); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT FAMILY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
YANGTZE DELTA, 1350–1988, at 58–76 (1990); HUANG, supra note 11, at 85–87;
SUCHETA MAZUMDAR, SUGAR AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: PEASANTS, TECHNOLOGY & THE
WORLD MARKET 192–250 (1998); LI, supra note 11, at 85–87.
25. See Leigh Shaw-Taylor, The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism and the Decline of
Family Farming in England, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, 4, 17–18, Mar. 1, 2011,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2010.00585.x/pdf; ROBERT C.
ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN: THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH
MIDLANDS 1450–1850, at 73, tbl.4-4, 78–104 (1992); Stephen Hipkin, The structure of
landownership and land occupation in the Romney Marsh region, 1646–1834, 51 AGRIC.
HIST. R. 69, 69 (2003); Daniel Grigg, Farm size in England and Wales, from early
Victorian times to the present, 35 AGRIC. HIST. R. 179, 188–89 (1987). See generally
R.H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1912); THE
BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 4.
26. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 2–5 (summarizing the field prior to 1992). Even
Allen, who is critical of this tradition, acknowledges that capitalist farms were somewhat
more productive. Id., at 18–19.
27. See supra note 24 (consider China’s lack of managerial farming an important
economic liability.)
28. Peter C. Perdue, China and the World Economy: Exports, Regions, and
Theories, 60 HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD. 259, 272–75 (2000); ALLEN, supra note 25, at 17–
19, 218–27.
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fundamentally economic debate that reaches far beyond the scope of
legal history, and this Article cannot offer a resolution. One might note,
of course, that the transition to capitalist farming was important for reasons
other than simply increasing agricultural productivity. Most notably, it
aided industrial development by freeing up labor and concentrating
capital. This latter effect was particularly valuable in economies that did
not recognize limited liability corporations, a characterization that applies to
both Qing China and pre-nineteenth century England.30 For our present
purposes, it suffices to state that one cannot argue intelligibly about the
broader Sino-English economic divergence without addressing the contrast
in the scale of agriculture, and that this contrast therefore deserves a
thorough examination of its causes.
Here, legal history takes a far more central role. England was not
always a land of managerial farms, nor was the transition easy. English
agriculture was, as noted above, predominately household-based even in
the sixteenth century, while the size of her agricultural population actually
increased by at least 30%—quite possibly by as much as 75%—between
29. Allen has been criticized, based on his own data, for heavily understating the
importance of capitalist farming to pre-1700 English agriculture. Shaw-Taylor, supra
note 25, at 6–7. His admission that capitalist farms were ultimately more efficient than
household farms has allowed some to use his own observations against him. See
Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 626.
30. E.g., ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM 57–59 (1999). The
idea that “primitive accumulation” of capital, particularly land, was crucial to the
initiation of capitalist growth and has been central to Western economic thought since
Adam Smith and Karl Marx. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 111 (Joseph Shield Nicholson ed., 1884); KARL MARX, 1
CAPITAL ch. 31, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch31.
htm (1867, last accessed Dec. 7, 2010). These ideas continue to be influential in modern
political economics. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF CAPITALISM:
CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION
2–5 (2000) (acknowledging primitive accumulation’s role in the creation of capitalism
but arguing that it displaced peasants); DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, 145–46,
149 (2003) (discussing accumulation by dispossession). Recent histories of Chinese
business have argued that the lack of capital concentration among late-Qing
entrepreneurs forced most companies to become joint-ventures, which was difficult and
costly without the possibility of limited liability. MADELEINE ZELIN, THE MERCHANTS OF
ZIGONG: INDUSTRIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 223–68 (2005);
William C. Kirby, China, Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in
Twentieth Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995). England also did not allow free
limited liability incorporation until the nineteenth century. Ron Harris, The Private
Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–1907, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1613206 (2009). But the concentration of wealth represented
and facilitated by managerial farming conceivably allowed English proto-industrialists to
bypass this institutional difficulty.
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1500 and 1700.31 Even in 1700, 60–80% of England’s population
was agricultural.32 Meanwhile, her vaunted textile industry remained very
modest in size until the later eighteenth century, as did her overseas trade.33
The creation of managerial farms during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries was, therefore, the fundamental reorganization of a predominantly
agricultural society, and not the transition between an agricultural society
and a manufacturing-based one. Rather than driving people from farming
into industrial shops, this process more often involved the contentious
process of purchasing land from smallholders, creating large farms, and
then reemploying the land-deprived poor as wageworkers. Qing China’s
active markets for land, technological development, and significant
urbanization34 saved Qing and Republican smallholders from a similar
fate?
Unsurprisingly, over two decades of academic discussion has not
produced any consensus. Some argued that labor was simply too expensive
for managerial farming in China.35 Others emphasized various institutional
or legal factors related to one’s ability to amass large, consolidated farms:
Chinese family division customs, the weaker power of eviction Chinese
landlords had against tenants, and lineage rights of first refusal (which
purportedly limited a Chinese landowner’s ability to sell his land.).36
31. The 30% figure is obtained by combining data from Robert C. Allen,
Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300-1800, 3 EUR. R.
ECON. HIST. 1, 11 (2000), and Theofanis C. Tsoulouhas, A New Look at Demographic
and Technological Changes: England, 1550 to 1839, 29 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST.
169, 176–77 (1992) (using data from Wrigley and Lindert). The former estimates the
percentage of the population in agriculture, while the latter estimates the total population.
Tsoulouhas’ figures starts from 1550, but the 1500 population is either very similar or
slightly lower. Allen’s estimate on the percentage of total population in agriculture for
1700, roughly 60%, is much lower than other estimates, which go up to 80%, see infra
note 32. If we use this latter figure, then the 30% estimate would become 75%.
32. For an analysis of the 80% figure, see S. Todd Lowry, The Agricultural
Foundation of the Seventeenth-Century English Oeconomy, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 74, 75
(2003). Lowry notes that 94% of the population was agricultural in 1520, whereas over
70% remained so in 1800. Assuming a linear decrease, the percentage in 1700 would be
around 80%. This is an underestimate, as the speed of urbanization accelerated in the
later 1700s. For an analysis of the 60% figure, see Allen, supra note 31.
33. For the relative unimportance of trade to the early modern English economy
and the “modest” size of her manufacturing sector, see RALPH DAVIS, THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION AND BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE 63 (1979). Davis’ evaluation is reconfirmed
in Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. R. 546 (2005),
although Acemoglu et al. argue that trade was institutionally important even if
statistically modest.
34. For markets and private property, see notes 11–13. For the underestimated
pace of Chinese technological development, see LI, supra note 11; and MAZUMDAR,
supra note 24, at 120–91.
35. See infra Part II.
36. Id.
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Anglo-American property law scholars will find this latter explanation
particularly intuitive. American legal historians have often argued that
“the Anglo-American system of private property emerged from a restrictive
feudal regime in which . . . alienation of land was prohibited.”37 As Henry
Maine stated, “the movement of the progressive societies has . . . been a
movement from Status to Contract.”38 Modern scholars continue to
believe that “[m]odernity . . . fosters alienability. . . . As groups modernize,
they . . . relax traditional restrictions on transfer.”39 Arguing that Chinese
agricultural inefficiencies stem from the inalienability of land certainly
constitutes a straightforward application of these ideas, but also one that
suffers from serious empirical defects. Existing evidence suggests that
lineage rights of first refusal did very little to obstruct the efficient
transaction of land in China’s core socioeconomic regions.40 Similarly,
the evidence fails to show that either family division customs or the lack
of eviction rights significantly impeded the spread of managerial farming.41
Other explanations have their own difficulties. Data from rural labor
markets indicate that most Chinese peasants who possessed surplus land
found it more productive and profitable to employ wage-labor than to
rent out the surplus. The existence of economic incentives that favored
managerial farming suggests, therefore, that its relative scarcity compared to
English agriculture might be attributed to institutional differences.
Previous scholarship has not, however, persuasively identified any such
difference.
This Article attempts to fill the gap. It argues that the primary “problem”
with Chinese property rights was not that they restricted the transaction
of land, but rather that they frequently gave the original owner of transacted
property an extremely strong right of redemption. The great majority of

37. Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits
in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 392 (2006).
38. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (3d
ed. 1866).
39. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1376–77 (1993).
See also JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 197–220 (5th ed. 2002). The
law and development literature provides clear empirical evidence that modern economic
development requires alienable property rights. Kevin Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock,
What Role Do Legal Institutions Play in Development? 4, available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/trebil.pdf (1999) (“The current economic
consensus would probably accord priority, in terms of the role of law in development, to
well-defined and alienable private property rights . . . .”).
40. See infra Part II.
41. Id.
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Chinese land transactions were neither permanent sales nor mortgages in
the modern sense, but “conditional sales” (dian) that transferred possessory
rights to the “buyer” while, under most local customs, guaranteeing the
“seller” a right of redemption at zero-interest that was virtually absolute
and interminable. The central government did prohibit conditional sales
redemption after a certain number of years, but had little success enforcing
these regulations. Land transactions could therefore avoid finalization
for decades. In comparison, English law and custom contained strong
limits on the redemption of “conditional” conveyances—mainly mortgages
—that forced permanent alienation if the seller failed to redeem within a
short time frame, customarily only a year. Enforcement of redemption
deadlines was extraordinarily harsh until the late seventeenth century,
making permanent alienation a frequent and dependable outcome even
for conditional conveyances, and thereby conveniencing the accumulation
of large farms.
In Qing and Republican China, however, the unlimited right of
redemption in dian sales meant that peasants had little incentive to
permanently alienate their land. If they needed a lump sum to cover
immediate needs, a conditional sale was usually satisfactory, while also
preserving the option of zero-interest redemption. If, however, they
simply wished to maximize the sale price of their land, the practice of
zhaotie in conditional sales, as discussed below, allowed them to take
advantage of future increases in land value—usually a reasonable
assumption.42 Permanent alienation was therefore unattractive, and rarely
used. Farmers who acquired land under a dian sale therefore found it
difficult to obtain secure and permanent ownership. For many, the lack
of security would have been enough deterrence against managerial farming,
as it cautioned against making capital investments to further boost
productivity. As for those enterprising peasants who nonetheless chose
to create managerial farms through conditional purchases, their farms
would face disintegration whenever an original owner decided to redeem,
always a real and disruptive possibility. Over the long run, these factors
impeded the concentration of farmland.
This explanation is heavily understudied in the existing literature. A
few scholars have made passing mention of the potential relationship
between conditional sales and land accumulation,43 but no serious analysis
currently exists, especially one conducted from a rigorously comparative
perspective. This is unfortunate, for the thesis proposed here neatly avoids
the empirical difficulties that haunt other theories. This Article seeks to
demonstrate its plausibility through surveying a fairly diverse collection
42.
43.
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of legal and economic data, drawn from both primary and secondary
sources.
Existing studies on the Qing and Republican regulation of conditional
sales disagree over a number of key issues, including the precise content
of central regulations and the extent to which they were enforced.44
Much of this Article focuses, therefore, on carefully presenting the
institutional comparison between Chinese conditional sales and English
mortgages, drawing particular attention to the complex relation between
customs and formal law. It then links this contrast in property rights
to the divergence in agricultural capitalism. This involves unpacking the
institutional economic theory outlined above in greater detail, but, more
importantly, testing it against data on transaction volume, land-ownership
patterns, and labor-to-land ratios. Existing evidence seems to confirm
our theoretical hypotheses admirably well.
The creation of efficient property rights depended, therefore, on more
than just making property rights “alienable,” that is, capable of being
transacted if the owner so desired.45 Whereas the problem with medieval
European property rights often was that they were simply inalienable,46
Qing and Republican property rights posed subtler difficulties: Although
they were generally alienable, the specific mechanisms of transaction
created questionable incentives for both sellers and buyers. Thus, any
property rights-based perspective on economic development must consider
not only whether property rights were alienable, but also how.
44.
45.

See infra pp. 150–52.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931–32 (1985) (defining inalienability as “any restriction on the
transferability, ownership, or use of an entitlement,” and noting that other scholars focus
only on situations where “sales are not permitted”). Even Rose-Ackerman’s broader
definition cannot incorporate the issues we discuss here. The only substantive restriction
of ownership, use or transferability we found was that the conditional buyer’s ownership
could be terminated by redemption, similar to how a mortgagee or tenant’s rights are not
absolute. Few would consider this a limitation upon alienability.
46. Entails limited the alienability of land in medieval England, although the
prevalence of “common recoveries” severely diminished their practical effects by 1500.
See Percy Bordwell, Alienability and Perpetuities III, 24 IOWA L. REV. 1, 51–56 (1938);
A. JAMES CASNER & BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 256 (1969). After
the demise of feudal incidents in the late seventeenth century, the entail was effectively
revived in the form of the strict settlement. See Charles J. Reid, The Seventeenth
Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 261–80 (1995).
Entails were widespread and powerful in France and Spain until the nineteenth century.
Raymond Carr, Spain, in THE EUROPEAN NOBILITY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 43, 51
(Albert Goodwin ed., 1967); ROBERT FORSTER, THE NOBILITY OF TOULOUSE IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY 120, 162–63 (1960).
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Our findings here also relate to important debates within law and
economics that address the economic efficiency of social norms.47 While
scholars have provided ample evidence that communities often create
their own social norms and, moreover, that these norms frequently outrank
formal laws in practical importance,48 they have vigorously debated whether
“norms are likely to promote social welfare,”49 with “welfare” regularly
defined as economic efficiency. Some express optimism, at least for
“closely-knit” communities that share information;50 others disagree.51
This Article offers a direct test-case: The Chinese land customs examined
here were probably the creation of close-knit rural communities, but also
lowered macroeconomic efficiency by impeding the development of
managerial farming. In fact, agricultural productivity would arguably have
risen had central regulations limiting land redemption been effectively
enforced. While it would be folly to “refute” the optimists based on one
historical example, however significant, it does present a challenge that
deserves consideration.
One lingering question is how and why Chinese rural communities
created these comparatively inefficient property customs in the first place.
Development economists might see the limiting effect that Chinese dian
norms had on land concentration as a case study of the surplus labor
model—the influential theory that agricultural communities often create
income-sharing mechanisms that allow agricultural workers to earn more
than their marginal product.52 As discussed below, it is indeed possible
that, consistent with the model’s predictions, poorer rural households
negotiated dian norms to protect against economic expansion by richer
households.53
Geographically, this Article focuses on the Lower Yangtze and North
China. It makes little sense to compare England with all of China due to
the enormous size difference. Instead, we focus only on the more
developed areas: the Lower Yangtze was the richest region in the
47. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537, 542 (1998).
48. A concise review of the relevant literature can be found in Ellickson, supra
note 47; and Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34
L. & SOC. REV. 157, 157 (2000). The path-breaking book in this field is, of course,
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 128–30
(1991).
49. Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
625, 635 (1997).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Gustav Ranis, The Microeconomics of “Surplus Labor” (Yale Econ.
Growth Ctr., Discussion Paper 772, 1997), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth
_pdf/cdp772.pdf.
53. See infra pp. 180–81.
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country, while North China was the relative “hotbed” of Chinese
managerial farming.54 Temporally, the Article covers 1500-1700 for
England, mainly because managerial farming had achieved predominance
by the latter date. The appropriate time frame for China is considerably
longer and somewhat later, as farming remained household-based
throughout the Qing and Republic. This article asks not only why
English agriculture made the transition by 1700, but also why Chinese
agriculture did not “catch up” for over two centuries, even though it had
every economic incentive, at both micro and macro levels, to do so. One
could say the same of the general Sino-English economic divergence: it
is intriguing not simply because China did not industrialize before Western
Europe, but also because it failed to do so long after the disparity had
become painfully obvious.
Part Two surveys the extent of managerial farming in England and
China. Part Three argues that existing explanations for this contrast are
generally unsatisfactory and provides some economic background. In
particular, the evidence suggests that it made economic sense, even in
China, for relatively wealthy peasants to pursue managerial farming.
Their general inability to do so suggests the existence of institutional
obstacles.
Parts Four, Five, and Six present the case for a conditional sales-based
explanation. Part Four examines Qing and Republican norms on
conditional sales, highlighting the clash between law and local custom,
in which the latter emerged victorious. Part Five then compares these
customs with English law and custom on various land transaction
mechanisms, arguing that English norms of land redemption were
drastically harsher. Part Six discusses the economic consequences of
this property rights comparison, conducting various empirical tests
for our proposed explanation. A short conclusion identifies avenues for
further research.
II. CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN EARLY MODERN
CHINA AND ENGLAND
The attractiveness of “managerial farming” as an academic concept
derives from its statistical flexibility and clarity. A “capitalist” or “managerial”
farm—for the sake of consistency, this Article will generally use the

54.

HUANG, supra note 11, at 69–84; WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17.
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latter term—is simply one that employs wage labor for most of its
everyday operations.55 This avoids artificial numerical “lower bounds,”
which would inevitably fail to account for at least some individual
circumstances. Equally important, it avoids the somewhat tedious debate
over Chinese landownership patterns, instead focusing directly on the
actual scale of farming. After all, in terms of agricultural productivity, a
100 mu plot that is rented out to ten tenants is hardly any different from
ten plots of 10 mu, separately owned. Finally, we might note that
managerial farms also exist in open-fields agriculture56—in fact, around
1700, more than half of open-fields agriculture in Southern England was
capitalist.57 It is not logically tied to “enclosure,” nor as ideologically
charged.
The idea that agricultural capitalism sparked the English economic
takeoff is exceedingly old and resilient.58 After much debate, scholars
have reached at least some consensus on the basic chronology. By 1700,
small-scale managerial farming predominated throughout the South,
especially in the vicinity of London.59 Although household production
still predominated in parts of the poorer Northwest, the transition was
nonetheless well underway, with nearly half of the farming population
employed as full-time wage-laborers.60 Whereas most scholars—some
rather reluctantly—would agree that this transition boosted agricultural
productivity,61 the classic theory that such increases set off English
economic divergence from continental Europe is questionable.62 Recent
studies show, for example, that the richer regions of France also
experienced a strong shift towards small-scale managerial farming
between 1550 and 1750.63
Despite deep and sweeping changes in Qing economic historiography
over the past decades, the notion that Qing agriculture relied predominantly
on household-level smallholdings remains unchallenged.64 Scholars have
55. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 56–57.
56. Even in open-fields agriculture, land was privately owned for most of the year.
See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1390 (1993).
57. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 73, tbl.4-4.
58. Id. at 2–5.
59. See sources cited supra note 25.
60. Shaw-Taylor, supra note 25.
61. See discussion supra notes 25–28. A literature review is also available at
PHILIP T. HOFFMAN, GROWTH IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: THE FRENCH COUNTRYSIDE,
1450–1815, at 143–45 (1996). For Hoffman’s own theories, see id. at 146–49, 162–64
(acknowledging that managerial farming boosted productivity).
62. HOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 143–49, 162–64.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that large manors, worked
by bound labor, was giving way to smallholders and tenants even around 1100);
POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 81 (more conservatively placing the transition at around
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periodically debated the extent of landownership concentration, but this
only discusses whether large landlords owned a higher percentage of total
land than previously assumed, not whether they farmed a higher percentage.
Higher concentration of ownership could simply have reflected a higher
level of tenancy. Joseph Esherick, for example, argues that “landlords”
and “rich peasants” owned around 56% of arable land in early twentieth
century China, but nonetheless concedes that around 42% of this was
rented out in small parcels.65
Given the significant regional variation in Chinese agriculture,
national-level statistics are of limited use. A better approach would be
to study individual agricultural regions, where ecological conditions and
farming techniques were more uniform. For conceptual clarity, we will
employ William Skinner’s physiographic subdivisions66 and, as mentioned
above, focus on “North China” and the “Lower Yangtze.” In John Buck’s
1937 statistical report, these are roughly equivalent to the “winter wheatkaoliang area” and the “Yangtze rice-wheat area.”67
Philip Huang’s 1985 manuscript remains the most comprehensive
agrarian study of North China. Huang estimates that hired labor accounted
for around 17% of total labor input, with about half of that coming from
managerial farms. 68 Including the owner’s own household labor,69
managerial farms incorporated perhaps 9.5% of labor input. Since labor
input-per-mu on “large” Northern farms was, according to Buck’s surveys,
around 90% of the median,70 managerial farms probably occupied at
least 11% of total farmland. A crude calculation based on Esherick’s
data 71 suggests a slightly higher figure. “Landlords” cultivated—as
1600). Both estimates support our claim, although McDermott’s data is more up-to-date
than the controversial source Pomeranz relies on. ELVIN, supra note 15.
65. Joseph W. Esherick, Number Games: A Note on Land Distribution in
Prerevolutionary China, 7 MODERN CHINA 387, 397, 405 (1981).
66. STANFORD UNIV. PRESS, THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 3–31 (G. William
Skinner ed., 1977).
67. JOHN L. BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION IN CHINA: A STUDY OF 16,786 FARMS IN 168
LOCALITIES, AND 38,256 FARM FAMILIES IN TWENTY-TWO PROVINCES IN CHINA, 1929–
1933, at 27 (1937).
68. HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 80–81. Other scholars, such as MAZUMDAR,
supra note 24, at 237, frequently cite to his data.
69. Calculated from Mantetsu survey data reproduced in HUANG (1985), supra
note 11, at 170.
70. JOHN L. BUCK, THE CHINESE FARM ECONOMY 47, 53 (1930).
71. Esherick, supra note 65, at 397, 402–05. These figures are derived by
subtracting the “land rented-out” from the total amount of land owned. Assume, for
example, that Class A of landowners owned x percent of total land under tenancy, which
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opposed to rented out—around 10% of total farmland, while “rich
peasants” cultivated another 18–20%. Assuming that nearly all
landlords and some of the wealthiest “rich peasants” ran managerial
farms, the total would probably be around 15% of total farmland.
Existing studies on the Lower Yangtze share fewer consensuses. The
common opinion seems to be that managerial farming was virtually nonexistent here: Wage labor accounted for less than 5% of total labor-input
and, in any case, was concentrated on rich peasant holdings that were too
small to be considered managerial.72 These arguments utilize two sources:
Buck’s data and a 1949 study by the East China Military Administration
Committee. This latter source indicates that roughly 4% of rural
households in the early twentieth century were “agricultural laborers,” but
this figure only includes landless households.73 Wage laborers that owned
any land were excluded. Moreover, the interpretation of Buck’s data is
surprising—by his calculation, hired labor accounted for 12-14% of the
Lower Yangtze’s total labor-input.74
This latter figure may be more plausible, even if Buck’s survey
overemphasizes the importance of large farms.75 By most estimates, the
average nineteenth century Lower Yangtze household could only
cultivate around 8 mu of grain—double-cropped—and 2 mu of mulberries
without the aid of hired labor.76 A detailed 1929 survey of three Wuxi
villages77 seems to support this assertion: nearly all farms that exceeded
10 mu employed substantial amounts of wage labor, generally for no less
than 100 labor days per year. Of the three farms that exceeded 20 mu,
wage labor accounted for more than 60% of total labor input on two, and
for nearly 50% on the third. This suggests that most farms larger than 20
mu were managerial. According to a 1920s study, such farms occupied
around 3 percent of total farmland in surveyed counties, while farms that
exceeded 15 mu accounted for another 32%.78 All in all, while the
scale of managerial farming was considerably smaller in the Lower
accounted for y percent of total land, and that Class A owned z percent of all arable land,
then the amount of land that Class A managed on its own would be z-x*y.
72. See, e.g., HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 58–60; MAZUMDAR, supra note 24,
at 237.
73. HUADONG JUNZHENG WEIYUANHUI, JIANGSU SHENG NONGCUN DIAOCHA 13,
29–30, 62–64 (1952).
74. BUCK, supra note 67, at 293.
75. This bias is well-known, but a quantitative adjustment seems impossible. See
Esherick, supra note 65; Randy Stross, Numbers Games Rejected, 10 REPUBLICAN CHINA
No. 3, at 1 (1985).
76. LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN, 1620–1850, at 136–
38, 140 (1998).
77. Bell, supra note 12, at 207, 226–29, 232–39.
78. See Li Bozhong, Rengeng Shimu yu Mingqing Jiangnan Nongmin de Jingying
Guimo, 1996 ZHONGGUO NONGSHI No.1, at 1, 6.
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Yangtze than in North China, it did exist. Wage labor was probably much
more prevalent than Huang suggests as well.
Still, when compared to eighteenth century English farming, even the
North China figures seem miniscule. Nor was agriculture in other Chinese
macroregions noticeably more concentrated. Nowhere did wage labor
account for even 25% of total labor input.79 Interestingly, the level of
land concentration in China could experience mild but prolonged declines
during times of relative peace, as it did between 1703 and 1771, and
between 1870 and 1930.80 There was ultimately a real and drastic difference
between China and post-1700 England in the scale of agricultural
production. But why?
III. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Existing explanations fall into two categories: economic and
institutional. The former argues that managerial farming simply made no
economic sense in China, either because it generated no increase in
productivity, involved too much risk, or, somewhat more plausibly, was
relatively unprofitable for most individual households.81 The economic
demand for managerial farming was therefore low. In comparison,
institutional explanations argue that legal or customary obstacles would
have prevented the creation of managerial farms even had demand been
high. Scholars have recently explored two different possibilities. Some
argue that certain Chinese customs restricted the free alienation of land
—that is, landowners found it difficult to convey land even if they wanted
to.82 Others claim that the problem was with rights of exclusion. Large
Chinese landlords were unable to expel their tenants and, therefore, could
not consolidate their holdings into managerial farms.83 Some also point
to differences between Chinese and English inheritance norms, arguing

79.
80.

BUCK, supra note 67, at 293.
For 1703 to 1771, see LI WENZHI, MINGQING SHIDAI FENGJIAN TUDI GUANXI DE
SONGJIE 58 (2007). For 1870 to 1930, see Ramon Myers, Land Distribution in
Revolutionary China, 8 THE CHUNG CHI J. 62 (1969).
81. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17; HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at
58-76; CHINESE CAPITALISM 1522–1840, at 158–61 (Xu Dixin & Wu Chengming eds., Li
Zhengde et al. trans., 2000).
82. See, e.g., HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 107–08; MAZUMDAR, supra note 24,
at 217–30. See also the discussion at POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 70–72.
83. The clearest argument to this is effect is made by Brenner & Isett, supra note
6.
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that English primogeniture promoted economies of scale by keeping
household property in one piece.84
Although recent developments in European economic history have
questioned whether farms consistently become more productive as they
increase in size, the key comparison in that particular debate has been
between smaller managerial farms and larger ones.85 The classical argument
that small-scale managerial production is, at least, more productive than
household production remains largely unchallenged.86 Existing data on
North China and the Lower Yangtze do seem to agree with this orthodoxy.
Buck’s surveys show that farms of all sizes generated nearly identical
per-crop acre yields in the early twentieth century, but yield rather chaotic
results on labor productivity. The general survey apparently shows that
“large farms” used less than 50% of the labor input-per-cultivated acre
that “small farms” needed, but a separate data sample suggests they used
around 87%. 87 Nonetheless, the general impression is that households
with surplus land could boost productivity by hiring outside labor, although
the size of that boost could vary tremendously. When we factor in the
more efficient use of farm animals and tools on large farms, 88 the
productivity edge is even more pronounced.
Theoretically, managerial farms enjoy several important efficiency
advantages over household-based ones. First, they usually manage labor
input more effectively, most intuitively because their larger size enables
greater labor specialization,89 but also because they can swiftly adapt to
changes in the size of land holding or production conditions by layingoff or hiring workers as circumstances demand.90 Moreover, their larger
size facilitates coordinated investments in the land that can improve its
84. See infra note 140.
85. See, e.g., Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Historical Alternatives to Mass
Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization,
108 PAST & PRESENT 133 (1985). For a survey of more theoretical writings, see
Matthew Gorton & Sophia Davidova, Farm productivity and efficiency in the CEE
applicant countries: a synthesis of results, 30 AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1 (2004).
86. See discussion supra notes 25, 29.
87. BUCK, supra note 67, at 273, 276; BUCK, supra note 70. Professor Pomeranz
raised some concerns at a 2011 American Historical Association panel discussion,
“Property Rights and Economic Development in the Qing” (Jan. 9, 2011), about whether
managerial farming really boosted labor productivity in the Lower Yangtze. I have yet
to see, however, any substantive evidence to the contrary. The most conservative
figures, drawn from BUCK, supra note 70, and reaffirmed by Pomeranz himself in Land
Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 101, 118–19
(2008), still suggest that large, predominantly managerial farms enjoyed a 13 percent
labor productivity edge even in the Yangtze Delta.
88. BUCK, supra note 67, at 277; see also, HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 144–
45.
89. HUANG, supra note 11, at 70.
90. Id.
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overall productivity, for example through optimizing irrigation, roads, or
use of animals and fertilizer.91 In short, managerial farming promotes
economies of scale.92 The main factors that potentially make managerial
farming less productive than household production are management and
supervision costs. By employing labor, one naturally increases the need
for planning and oversight. In some cases these costs may be so high
that they negatively affect productivity, but as we discuss later, such
scenarios were unlikely in Qing and Republican China.93
A more complicated and ultimately more important issue is whether
managerial farming was profitable enough to attract individual landowners,
even if they were more productive. Profit is, after all, a better predictor
of individual economic behavior than productivity. Several scholars
have argued that the cost of hired labor was so high in the Yangtze Delta
that landowners made larger profits by leasing out their land than by
consolidating it into managerial farms.94 The primary evidence for this
claim seems to be a set of late-nineteenth century missionary surveys
collected by Li Wenzhi, which suggest that leasing out was 35%
more profitable than managerial farming in Southern Jiangsu, and nearly
three times as profitable in Zhejiang.95 As Li himself admits, however,
his data relied heavily on a few scattered case studies and “are generally
of limited trustworthiness.”96 In fact, recent estimates of Lower Yangtze
wages from 1750 to the early twentieth century would lower Li’s wage
figures by 30 to 55%, or by 6 to 16 taels of silver.97 Using these more
conventional estimates, managerial farming was more profitable than

91. See discussion infra p. 175.
92. While it is also possible for several smaller farms to make these investment
decisions cooperatively, consolidating the smaller patches under more unified ownership
helps internalize and lower the transaction and organization costs involved. Ronald H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
93. See discussion infra pp. 145–47.
94. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17; HUANG, supra note 24, at 58–76.
95. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17.
96. Id. at 216; see also HUANG, supra note 24, at 58–76 (but these pamphlets
largely come from the early Qing, when labor was considerably scarcer).
97. The 1750 estimates come from POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 319–20 (estimating
an upper-limit wage of around 12 taels). Robert Allen et al. argue, in Wages, Prices, and
Living Standards in China, 1738–1925: In comparison with Europe, Japan, and India
51, (Oxford Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 316 (2007), that the nominal
agricultural wage basically remained stable (or declined slightly) from 1750 to the
nineteenth century and largely confirm Pomeranz’s estimates. Li’s wage estimates,
supra note 24, at 216, when converted to silver taels, suggest an annual agricultural wage
of around 28 taels for Southern Jiangsu and around 18 taels for Zhejiang.
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leasing by at least 60% in Southern Jiangsu, and equally profitable in
Zhejiang.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Li’s figures are representative,
they would imply that very few Lower Yangtze households had incentive to
employ any wage labor. In particular, while Li’s estimates focus on the
cost of year-laborers, a quick calculation based on his sources indicates
that day-laborers were comparably unprofitable. Using Li’s data, leasing
out would still have been 27 to 33% more profitable than employing daylaborers in Southern Jiangsu, and more than 2.5 times as profitable in
Northern Zhejiang.98 The problem is that wage labor was, in fact, important
to the Lower Yangtze economy. As argued above, households employing
some wage labor conceivably occupied 50% of total farmland99—wage
labor accounted for perhaps 15% of total agricultural labor input.100
For Li’s data to make sense, we must assume that most of these
households were financially irrational. Given that most Lower Yangtze
households farmed significantly less than 10 mu,101 households wishing
to rent out excess land would have encountered a healthy supply of
potential tenants. The assumption of widespread economic irrationality is,
however, without merit.102 Apparently, the employment of wage labor was
profitable enough to attract a very significant portion of rural households,
which makes good sense under the more recent wage data discussed above.
In any case, arguments that labor was too expensive are strictly limited to
the Lower Yangtze. As their proponents acknowledge, quite the opposite
was true of North China, where managerial farming was considerably

98. This calculation uses data presented at Bell, supra note 12, and JOHN L. BUCK,
LAND UTILIZATION IN CHINA: STATISTICS 328 (1937), and assumes that the average yearlaborer worked around 200 days, HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 81.
99. See discussion supra p. 141 (Farms exceeding 15 mu occupied 35% of total
farmland, while nearly all farms exceeding 10 mu employed some wage labor. While we
do not have precise numbers for households owning between 10 and 15 mu, it seems
reasonable to assume that they occupied at least 15% of total farmland—given that farms
between 15 and 20 mu occupied nearly a third of total farmland—and, therefore,
reasonable to suggest that farms employing some wage labor occupied around 50% of
total farmland).
100. See discussion surrounding supra note 74.
101. By the mid-nineteenth century, the average Lower Yangtze household farmed
around 7 mu, split 7:3 between rice and mulberries. Various existing estimates and
figures are compiled at Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 620.
102. See Bell, supra note 12. After the Song Dynasty, while certain elite families
were still politically ambitious enough to focus instead on national examinations and
political ties, even most gentry households depended on landholding and economic
affluence for their social status. See HILARY BEATTIE, LAND AND LINEAGE IN CHINA: A
STUDY OF T’UNG-CH’ENG COUNTY, ANHWEI, IN THE MING AND CH’ING DYNASTIES
(1979); BEVERLY BOSSLER, POWERFUL RELATIONS: KINSHIP, STATUS, AND STATE IN SUNG
CHINA (1996). Anyone who wishes to argue that rural Chinese households eschewed
profit-maximizing behavior must, therefore, bear the burden of the proof.
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more profitable than leasing out.103 This certainly makes the predominance
of smallholding there all the more puzzling. Labor prices were, therefore,
probably not too high for managerial farming, but were they too low
instead? A few scholars have also suggested that Qing population growth
made managerial farms less profitable, mainly by lowering labor prices
and making capital investment less attractive.104 But there is no reason
why a managerial farm must be capital-intensive. It could very well be
labor-intensive, yet enjoy higher productivity simply through more
efficient management of labor and better use of previous capital
investments.105
One concern is that farms with more intensive labor input might be
harder to supervise, which leads to the broader question of whether
managerial farms were too costly to supervise in China. Such arguments
are rarely seen in the English-language literature,106 but merit consideration
nonetheless. A preliminary variable to consider might be geographical
segregation. Arable land might be too naturally scattered to cheaply
manage. But this clearly was not true of North China or the Lower
Yangtze, which had reasonably concentrated and flat farmland.107 More
importantly, moral hazard issues can exist where the employee earns a
fixed wage, but his employer cannot efficiently monitor or control his
behavior.108 The more hired labor a farm requires, the higher supervision

103. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17; HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at
69–72.
104. Zhao Gang, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHIDU SHI, ch. 5 (2006); see also Martin Heijdra,
The Socio-Economic Development of Rural China During the Ming, in 8 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 417, 525–26 (Denis Twitchett & Frederick Mote eds.,
1998).
105. This certainly does not mean that Chinese farms made no capital
investments—quite the opposite, they made many, which further calls into question the
theories in supra note 104. See discussion surrounding infra notes 327–29; see also
Kaoru Sugihara, Labour-intensive Industrialisation in Global History (Kyoto Working
Papers on Area Studies No. 1, 2007), available at www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/edit/
wp/Sugihara_WP_Web_081018.pdf (regarding the importance of labor-intensive
production in global economic history).
106. I find only one example: Heijdra, supra note 104, devotes one paragraph to
this.
107. HUANG, supra note 11, at 53–66; HUANG, supra note 24, at 21–43.
108. Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, A Theory of Contractual Structure in
Agriculture, 75 A M . E CON . R EV . 352, 359–60 (1985) (arguing that, as long as
management costs are low, rational landowners will employ wage labor whenever their
own managerial abilities outpaced those of their employed workers). Since, as we have
discussed at pp. 142–43, labor and animal productivity were notably higher on managerial
farms than on household-size ones, we may reasonably assume that this latter condition
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costs become. When applied to Qing China, however, such concerns seem
unnecessary. Since most plots above 20 mu (3 acres) in Jiangnan were
managerial, it would have taken around 10 minutes to walk around the
basic managerial farm.109 A managerial farm in North China would have
been larger, but still small enough to circle in 30 minutes.110 In comparison,
early modern English managerial farmers frequently managed 200 acres
or more. 111 Our question here is not why Chinese farms were not
managerial on the scale of English farms, but rather, why they were
generally not managerial at all, when even smaller managerial farms
enjoyed notable labor and animal productivity boosts.112
A final economic explanation to consider is the potential attractiveness
of risk-sharing—landowners with surplus land may tend to prefer a
secure rent over a riskier crop yield.113 This theory also runs into empirical
difficulties. Generally, we expect smaller landowners, who are more at risk
from economic fluctuations, to be more risk-averse than larger
landowners.114 In Qing China, however, we have shown that smaller
households who owned some surplus land, but not enough for managerial
farming, employed wage-labor regularly.115 This suggests that risk-sharing
was probably not a prevalent priority for those who could afford managerial
farming.116 All things considered, purely economic considerations do
not seem capable of explaining China’s lack of managerial farming.
It must be noted, however, that many of the wealthiest landowners in
the Lower Yangtze chose to become “absentee landlords” instead of
managerial farmers, renting their holdings to tenants while living in
urban centers, preferring the comforts of urban life and the political and
commercial opportunities it offered. 117 On the other hand, such
opportunities were largely limited to the highest echelon of landowners.118
was met. Kang Chao, Tenure Systems in Traditional China, 31 ECON. DEV. & CULT.
CHANGE 295 (1983) (sharecropping was in steady decline in China since at least 1500).
109. See discussion supra p. 141.
110. HUANG, supra note 11, at 70.
111. Shaw-Taylor, supra note 25, at 4–6.
112. See discussion supra p. 143.
113. Heijdra, supra note 104.
114. See Luigi Guiso & Monica Paiella, Risk Aversion, Wealth and Background
Risk, 6 J. OF EURO. ECON. ASS’N 1109 (2008) (“We find that risk aversion is a decreasing
function of the endowment . . . .”).
115. See discussion supra pp. 141–42.
116. See Chao, supra note 108, at 312 (“There seems to be no strong statistical
evidence to suggest that distribution of tenurial contracts was based on the consideration
of risk factors.”).
117. Madeleine Zelin, China’s Economy in Comparative Perspective, 1500
Onward, in ASIA IN WESTERN AND WORLD HISTORY 474 (Ainslie Embree & Carol Gluck
eds., 1997).
118. Landlords probably constituted less than 5% of total population. Esherick,
supra note 65, at 405.
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The vast majority of rural landowners and tenants regularly acted to
maximize their agricultural profits,119 which, as we argued, would have
encouraged managerial farming, not rent-collecting.
There is some reason to suspect that even absentee landlords might
have shared these preferences120 and that they rented out their holdings
due to necessity, not choice. As analyzed in detail below,121 the
landholdings of these large landlords were usually so scattered that
managerial farming was not possible. Instead of owning several large
plots, most large landowners owned dozens to hundreds of small and
unconnected plots, which could not efficiently support managerial farming
unless consolidated. I argue below that this was not by choice. Rather,
they were unable to purchase land in more efficient patterns.122 The
prevalence of absentee landlordism among these large landowners does
not, therefore, speak to the relative profitability of tenancy versus
managerial farming. Rather, this latter option was inaccessible due to
external factors.
All in all, the fact that economic incentives actually favored the creation
of managerial farms suggests that we should be looking for institutional
obstacles. One approach, recently advocated by Robert Brenner and
Christopher Isett, is to examine whether landlords possessed strong
rights of exclusion against their tenants.123 Lower Yangtze tenants, for
example, frequently enjoyed “permanent tenancy” (yong dian) rights,
which protected them against exclusion and rent increases as long as
they paid their rents. This right was strictly customary, since Qing
provincial laws often attempted to ban the practice, although with
limited success.124 Brenner and Isett argue that these customs prevented
Chinese landlords from excluding their tenants and creating large,
consolidated plots capable of supporting managerial farming.125 In
comparison, British landlords had stronger exclusion powers, and were
therefore able to build managerial farms.126

119. See supra notes 12, 102.
120. See discussion supra note 102.
121. See discussion infra pp. 178–79.
122. Id.
123. Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 614–20.
124. See, e.g., YANG GUOZHEN, MING QING TUDI QIYUE WENSHU YANJIU 115
(1988); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING
AND REPUBLIC COMPARED 107–08 (2001).
125. Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 614–20.
126. Id.
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While the institutional contrast Brenner and Isett highlight probably
existed, the exclusion of tenants was simply not the primary means of
creating managerial farms even in England. The general consensus
among English economic historians is that the initial creation of large
farms during the sixteenth century was tenant-driven, instead of landlorddriven.127 In addition, even when landlords became the main force in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they utilized both purchases and
exclusions to increase farm size.128 Thus, the principle mechanism by
which plot-size increased was the combining of adjacent farms via either
outright purchase or mortgage closure, rather than exclusion of tenants.129
Chinese landlords may well have possessed weaker exclusion rights, but
this does not satisfactorily explain why China had less managerial
farming. We must still ask why relatively richer peasants were unable to
purchase enough land to create managerial farms, and especially why
richer tenants did not, as they did in England, purchase enough tenancy
rights from poorer neighbors—there is certainly no rule against creating
managerial farms on rented land. Quite the opposite, the secure nature
of tenancy rights in Qing China made this quite appealing.
One proposed solution is to emphasize the existence of lineage-based
obstacles to alienability. Some have argued that local customs in both
the Lower Yangtze and South China granted households the right of first
refusal or even an outright veto power when their lineage members
attempted to sell land.130 In addition, lineage-owned land, which may
have occupied as much as 35% of arable land in Guangdong, was simply
inalienable.131 Landowners therefore found it difficult to convey land
even if they wanted to, which naturally made buying land equally
difficult. English laws and customs seemed to impose fewer restrictions
on free alienation. Legal historians have long agreed that, by at least the
fifteenth century, royal and local courts expressed distinct hostility towards

127. E.g. R.W. Hoyle, Tenure and the Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a
Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate, 43 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 2, 14 (1990); P.
Glennie, Distinguishing Men’s Trades: Occupational Sources and Debates for
Precensus England, in HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY RESEARCH SERIES 1, 33 (1990). More
generally, see the discussion in Leigh Shaw-Taylor’s working paper on Agrarian
Capitalism, supra note 25.
128. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 14–15.
129. For the importance of mortgages in land transaction, see Christopher Clay,
Property Settlements, Financial Provision for the Family, and Sale of Land by the
Greater Landowners, 1660–1790, 21 J. BRIT. STUD. 18 (1981); ALLEN, supra note 25, at
15.
130. HUANG, supra note 24, at 108; MAZUMDAR, supra note 24, at 226–31; POMERANZ,
supra note 3, at 70.
131. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 71–72.
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inalienable rights in land, mainly by recognizing and creating methods to
break entail.132
Although this comparison of alienability is attractively straightforward,
more recent scholarship suggests that it cannot adequately explain China’s
relative lack of managerial farming. First, lineages in the Lower Yangtze
and South China were generally so large that “kin first” rules, or even
“kin only” rules, would still have allowed many potential buyers to compete
for most plots.133 Second, although lineages owned a fair amount of
“corporate land” in Guangdong, their holdings were miniscule elsewhere,
including the Lower Yangtze and North China.134 Finally, certain Medieval
English borough and manor customs gave family members and heirs a
“right of first purchase” similar to what we see in China,135 suggesting
that one should be cautious when arguing that kinship-based inalienability
was unique to China.
Kenneth Pomeranz has recently suggested another way of measuring
the economic effects of such customary restrictions.136 If, in fact, these
restrictions constituted a significant barrier to free alienation, we would
expect that, as individual households fluctuated in size, they would have
difficulty “adjusting the amount of land they worked to the amount of
labor they possessed.”137 There should, therefore, be large differences in
labor input per-mu between different size classes. Such variance should
be particularly acute among small and medium farms, which employed
little wage labor. Some of Buck’s survey data present, however, a very
different picture. If labor input per-mu on small farms was set at 100,
then it was around 95 on medium farms, and around 87 on large farms.138
Disregarding the discrepancies within Buck’s data for the moment,139
this suggests that customary restrictions placed no significant burden on
free land alienation.

132. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 318–21 (3d ed.
1990).
133. SUSAN NAQUIN & EVELYN RAWSKI, CHINESE SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 100–01 (1987); POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 72.
134. CHEN HAN-SENG, LANDLORD AND PEASANT IN CHINA 34–35 (1936); BUCK,
supra note 67, at 192 (estimating that 93% of arable land in China was owned in “fee
simple” by individual households).
135. See, e.g., 21 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 66–68.
136. Pomeranz, supra note 87.
137. Id.
138. BUCK, supra note 70.
139. See discussion supra pp. 142–43.
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Finally, we should address the somewhat ancient thesis that differences
between Chinese and English inheritance norms allowed for greater
concentration of land-ownership in England.140 The basic idea is that,
due to primogeniture and entail, English landowners were able to keep
their holdings in one piece from generation to generation, while Chinese
landowners, who customarily gave all sons equal inheritance, often saw
their holdings split into smaller pieces by later generations.141 This
institutional comparison is, first of all, highly questionable and ambiguous.
The widespread use of wills, trusts, and various “entail breaking”
instruments in England since at least the fifteenth century allowed
landowners to easily secure land for younger sons despite primogeniture
and entail,142 while Chinese cultural and customary traditions that
promoted lineage solidarity often discouraged sons from disintegrating
family property.143
Even if we unwisely disregard these complexities, the logical connection
between family division and the prevalence of managerial farming would
still be tenuous. A family that possesses both a managerial farm and
multiple male heirs—who constitute the bulk of the household labor
supply—would only create a number of smaller managerial farms after

140. See NAGANO AKIRA, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHIDU DE YANJIU 66 (Qiang Wo trans.,
2004); William Lavely & R. Bin Wong, Family Division and Mobility in North China,
34 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. & HIST. 439, 448 (1992); DAVID WAKEFIELD, FENJIA:
HOUSEHOLD DIVISION AND INHERITANCE IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 188–91;
CHRISTOPHER ISETT, STATE, PEASANT, AND MERCHANT IN QING MANCHURIA, 1644–1862,
at 173. The more recent works argue that Chinese family division had negative effects
on productivity and earning potential, which is undoubtedly correct, but do not explicitly
link these effects to China’s relative lack of managerial farming. In an earlier work,
Huang briefly suggests that partible inheritance obstructed managerial farming, but then
immediately states that the effects of population growth and farm division were
“ambiguous,” as they could also pressure more households to sell their land due to poverty.
HUANG, supra note 11, at 117–18. For a summary of eighteenth and nineteenth century
English academic thinking on primogeniture and entail, see William L. Miller,
Primogeniture, entails and endowments in English classical economics, 12 HIST. OF POL.
ECON. 558 (1980).
141. NAGANO, supra note 140.
142. For a discussion of how trusts were used to avoid primogeniture, see Kent D.
Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 U. OF MO.-KAN.
CITY L. REV. 181, 185–191 (2009). The ineffectiveness of entail is discussed at G.R.
RUBIN & DAVID SUGARMAN, LAW, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, 1750–1914: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 39 (1984). See ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH
INDIVIDUALISM: FAMILY, PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1978), which argues that
the widespread use of wills and trusts made institutions like primogeniture largely
ineffective. See also id. at 104.
143. NAGANO, supra note 140, at 122. See also the case discussed at K.Y. Wong,
Dispute Resolution by Officials in Traditional Chinese Legal Culture, 10 MURDOCH U.
ELEC J.L. No. 2, at § 8, available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/
wong102_text.html (2003). The official was applauded for preventing family division,
even though the brothers were within their rights to seek it.
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household division. For example, a managerial farm with two male
heirs and four hired laborers would create two managerial farms with
one owner and two laborers each after division. On the other hand, if
family division led to the creation of two non-managerial farms, then
logically the original undivided farm could not have been managerial
either. Family division does not, therefore, affect the total amount or
percentage of Chinese farmland under managerial farming. Managerial
farming exists if, and only if, household labor tills less than half the plot.
If household labor were not expanding in the first place, there would
probably be no need for family division.
None of this is to say that family division had no impact on per-capita
wealth—by dividing family assets, households would lose some economies
of scale, mainly in the form of lower labor productivity. This clearly
affected future earning potential, but as pointed out above, lower
productivity also meant that it took less land per-capita to create
managerial farms. While a unified household with two sons might need
to own 22 mu/person to create a managerial farm, this threshold might
drop to 20 mu/person after family division, as each son was no longer
capable of farming as much land on his own. This mathematically
cancelled out the drop in earning potential.
Moreover, family division becomes macro-economically significant
only when there is substantial population growth, but North China and
the Lower Yangtze often failed to satisfy this prerequisite. Population
growth in these two regions was dramatically slower than the national
average due to outward migration.144 The population of the Lower
Yangtze grew by perhaps 35% from 1750 to 1850, much of it in urban
areas, whereas the national average might have been around 80%.145 It
then fell by over 25% between 1850 and 1930—back to 1750 levels,
while the national average was still steadily increasing.146 A similar
situation existed in North China, where the population of Zhili Province,

144. HO PING-TI, STUDIES ON THE POPULATION OF CHINA, 1368–1953, at 136–68
(1959).
145. For the Lower Yangtze, see HUANG JINGBIN, MINSHENG YU JIAJI: QINGCHU ZHI
MINGUO SHIQI JIANGNAN JUMIN DE XIAOFEI 70–71 (2009). Population growth in urban
areas was much faster than elsewhere, further lessening the effect of family division on
agriculture. Id. at 17. For national figures, see Robert B. Marks, China’s Population
Size during the Ming and Qing 3, available at http://web.whittier.edu/people/webpages/
personalwebpages/rmarks/pdf/env.panel_remarks.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
146. HUANG, supra note 145.
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for example, hardly grew at all before 1850. 147 All in all, existing
institutional explanations seem incapable of explaining China’s relative
lack of managerial farming.
IV. CONDITIONAL SALES IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA
This hardly means, however, that it is impossible to craft a plausible
institutional explanation. The theories examined above focus mainly on
whether Chinese peasants could permanently sell land, and not whether
they actually would. The remainder of this article argues that the main
problem with Chinese property rights was, in fact, that peasants could
transact their land in ways that English law did not allow, and that this
created problematic incentives, chiefly for the potential seller. In particular,
we should pay greater attention to the existence of conditional sales
(dian), which allowed reluctant sellers to retain rights of redemption—
at, in fact, the original sale price—for as long as they chose.
The relationship between this somewhat peculiar “institution” and
China’s relative lack of managerial farming remains severely
underdeveloped. Although a few scholars have alluded to it, no serious
analysis exists. Liang Zhiping, for example, suggests that conditional
sales could have prevented land accumulation, but provides no economic
data or reasoning to support this brief assertion.148 An article by Pomeranz
briefly expresses support for Liang’s claims, yet goes on to argue that
conditional sales really had little effect on land purchasing.149 Isett’s
recent book on the Manchurian economy discusses both conditional
sales and the lack of managerial farming without drawing a specific
casual relation between them.150 In any case, what applies to Manchuria
does not necessarily apply to North China or the Lower Yangtze. If
conditional sales did indeed affect managerial farming in the Chinese
core, the existing literature has yet to adequately explain how. Moreover,
no previous work has attempted to compare conditional sales with English
norms of land transaction. Rigorous comparison is, however, logically
necessary if we are to tackle Sino-English agricultural divergence.
Qing and Republican conditional land sales were conceptually simple:
the original owner “sold” land under the condition that he could later

147. Xing Long, Jindai Huabei Nongcun Renkou Liudong ji qi Xiaozhang, 2000 (4)
LISHI YANJIU, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1109&context=student_papers&sei-redir=1#search=%22Xing%20Long%2C%20Jindai
%20Huabei%20Nongcun%20Renkou%20Liudong%20ji%20qi%20Xiaozhang%22.
148. LIANG ZHIPING, QINGDAI XIGUAN FA: SHEHUI YU GUOJIA 173–78 (1996).
149. Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 105, 123–30.
150. ISETT, supra note 140, at 85–89, 161–72.
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redeem it at the original price.151 Tenants, who generally enjoyed decent
security of tenure in China’s economic core, could also transfer their
rights of possession through these instruments.152 In either situation, the
buyer could utilize the land as he wished until redemption. 153 Such
contracts might specify, as a benefit to the conditional buyer, a period of
time (xian) in which he was guaranteed usage of the land.154 The seller
could potentially reimburse the initial payment before this period expired,
but could only regain usage rights after the expiration.155 On the other
hand, he was under no obligation to redeem immediately upon the
expiration; as long as the contract did not expressly set a deadline for
redemption, he could redeem at “any time after the guaranteed-usage
period had expired.”156
In any kind of conditional sale, the seller might decide to part with this
right of redemption, either because he could not afford to redeem, or
because he had simply lost interest in the land. When this happened, the
conditional buyer would obtain full ownership rights, but would have to
pay the seller an “additional payment” (zhao tie), equal to the difference
between the original conditional sale price and the present market value
of the land.157
Naturally, complications arose in actual practice. Most important was
the issue of redemption: could the parties set a deadline for redemption? If
the original contract did not expressly mention the deadline issue, would
a default deadline apply, either by law or by custom? The few historians
who have studied these issues share little consensus. Some argue that

151. Both the Qing Code and the earlier Ming Code simply define “dian” as a sale
that could be redeemed. DA QING LV LI [THE GREAT QING CODE] 95.03 (1905); DA
MING LV [THE GREAT MING CODE], Hu Lv: Tian Zhai Men. On redemption at the
original price, see LIANG, supra note 148, at 93 (1996); WU XIANGHONG, DIAN ZHI
FENGSU YU DIAN ZHI FALV 35 (2009).
152. See discussion supra accompanying note 83. Tenants were free to transfer or
sublease their tenancy rights. See Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 131.
153. This would be buyer’s incentive for participating in the sale despite not
obtaining any interest on his “loan” (redemption was at the original price)—the lump
sum he conveyed to the seller. See WU, supra note 151, at 100–03.
154. LIANG, supra note 148; Henry McAleavy, Dien in China and Vietnam, 17 J.
ASIAN ST. 403, 406–07 (1958). Some have mistakenly interpreted “xian” as a deadline
for redemption. See, e.g., discussion at infra notes 199, 200. But this would conflict
with any reasonable reading of either customary or legal sources. See discussion infra
notes 187, 206. See also WU, supra note 151, at 100–03.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. These practices are summarized at HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 74–75.
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norms on all levels, from the Qing Code down to local custom, approached
conditional sales from a basic presumption of permanent land-ownership
and, therefore, protected strong redemption rights.158 Others counter that
Qing laws and customs were not hostile to the permanent alienation of
land, while large numbers of people freely engaged in complex land
transactions for pure financial gain.159
A more comprehensive survey of relevant law and custom suggests
that the actual situation fell somewhere in the middle. Local customs in
the regions we study do indeed display a prevalent social sympathy for
attempts to maintain permanent land-ownership. They generally did not
recognize redemption deadlines, permitting conditional sellers to retain
redemption rights indefinitely. Central-level authorities, however, were
hostile to such practices and banned redemption after eleven years. Faced
with this conflict between law and custom, local magistrates generally
left conditional land sale disputes to local mediation. While probably
just a prudent act of self-preservation, this nonetheless shielded local
customs from hostile legal regulations. Qing and Republican property
rights did, therefore, favor strong redemption rights in practice, even
though they may have opposed them as a matter of formal legal theory.
Section IV.A examines how county-level customs throughout China
regulated conditional sales contracts. Section IV.B then describes how
the Qing Code and other central regulations treated such transactions.
Due to the lack of a new civil code after the Qing collapse, these rules
remained in effect until the mid-Republican era.160 Section IV.C argues
that local courts very rarely enforced these laws and regulations that
contradicted local customs.
A. Local Custom
The term “custom,” as legal historians generally use it, is medieval
European in origin. It refers to “rule[s] acknowledged by the population
of a particular locality as having a binding force.”161 As the medieval
158. HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 71–98. See also, MELISSA MACAULEY,
SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA
230–45 (1998); YANG, supra note 124, at 279; Yang Guozhen, Shilun Qingdai Minbei
Minjian de Tudi Maimai, 1 ZHONGGUOSHI YANJIU 29 (1981).
159. THOMAS BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS AND MORAL ECONOMY: VIOLENT
DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA 94 (2000); POMERANZ,
supra note 3, at 70–73.
160. Late-Qing and early-Republican judicial reform efforts succeeded partially in
constructing new courts and legal procedures, but were unable to seriously revise
substantive civil law until the issuance of a new civil code in 1929. HUANG (2001),
supra note 124, at 47–48.
161. Jerome Bourgon, Uncivil Dialouge: Law and Custom Did Not Merge into Civil
Law under the Qing, 23 LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 50, 53 (2002).
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Canonists saw it, “custom resonate[d] within law, while ordinary practice
pertain[ed] to the domain of fact.”162 In essence, a custom was a habitual
practice that had acquired normative status.163 It may be—as so many
legal or social-science concepts are—a weberian “ideal type,”164 but this
does not necessarily detract from its usefulness in describing, however
approximately, rules that govern social behavior, either due to fear of
sanction or internalization,165 rather than merely describe it. Modern
property rights scholars often call these rules “social norms,”166 but legal
historians probably remain more familiar with the term “custom.”
Although “custom,” a concept of western origin, might have no
straightforward equivalent in Qing legal terminology,167 it would
nonetheless be foolish to assume that Qing localities had no normative
custom of their own. After all, conditional sales had been perhaps the most
popular form of land transaction for longer than the dynasty itself,168 but
central regulation was sparse until the eighteenth century.169 The myriad
of disputes triggered by conditional sales were somehow resolved in the
absence of formal law, allowing ample opportunity for the development
of local custom. Existing sources, most importantly a number of early
twentieth century surveys,170 do indeed indicate the existence of wellestablished customs in the Qing.171
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 54.
Id.
MAX W EBER , ECONOMY AND S OCIETY : A N O UTLINE OF I NTERPRETATIVE
SOCIOLOGY 20–21(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.,
Bedminster Press 1968).
165. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
166. Id.; see also discussion supra pp. 135–36.
167. The term did not enjoy widespread use in China until the early twentieth
century. SUI HONGMING, QINGMO MINCHU MINSHANGSHI XIGUAN DIAOCHA ZHI YANJIU
18–76 (2005). Academic attempts to search for references to “custom” in Qing
adjudication have often been overzealous, overlooking the possibility that those
references were merely observations of habitual social fact, not norms. Shiga Shuzo,
Qingdai Susong Zhidu zhi Minshi Fayuan de Kaocha, in MING QING SHIQI DE MINSHI
SHENPAN YU MINJIAN QIYUE 54 (Wang Yaxin & Liang Zhiping eds., Wang Yaxin trans.,
1998).
168. Yang (1981), supra note 158, at 31.
169. See discussion infra pp. 156–59.
170. MINSHANGSHI XIGUAN DIAOCHA BAOGAOLU [hereinafter XGDC] (Sifa
Xingzheng Bu ed., 1930).
171. As early as the Ming Dynasty, scholars and officials had encouraged local
communities to establish “county pacts” (xiang yue) as a source of order and regulation.
Terada Hiroaki, Ming Qing Shiqi Fazhixu zhong de “Yue” de Xingzhi, in MING QING
SHIQI DE MINSHI SHENPAN YU MINJIAN QIYUE, supra note 167, at 178. See also WILLIAM
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The surveys were initiated in 1903 by the Qing court, but not completed
until 1923.172 The original intent, shared by both Qing and Republican
authorities, was to gather information for the drafting of a new civil
code.173 The researchers in charge explicitly sought to identify local
“customs” (xiguan) that possessed binding force,174 and indeed produced
a vast collection of local practices that, at least as presented in the final
report, were clearly normative in nature. Numerous researchers commented
on the “binding force” of certain customs, or how they could be used to
“combat” non-conforming actions.175 Republican era jurists took the
normative nature of these customs seriously enough to designate them a
formal source of law in the new 1929 Civil Code: “where the Code is
silent, the courts shall apply custom.”176 At the time, the survey reports
were the only extensive compilation of Chinese custom in existence.
Despite the geographical diversity of the survey, which covered most
of the country, its reports on conditional sales revealed considerable
uniformity among local customs. Nearly all surveyed counties, for
example, had customary prohibitions against redeeming conditionally
sold land between the initial sowing of seeds and the final harvest.177
Most prohibited early redemption if the contract had set a guaranteedusage period.178 More importantly for the purposes of this paper, almost
none of the several hundred surveyed counties—and, indeed, only one
county in North China or the Lower Yangtze—imposed any customary
deadline on redemption.179 Instead, the near-universal assumption seemed

ROWE, SAVING THE WORLD: CHEN HONGMOU AND ELITE CONSCIOUSNESS IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY CHINA 102–03 (2003) (discussing the positive assessment of “xiangyue” by
prominent officials). The local creation of written custom was prevalent in the Qing.
Terada, supra; SUN LIJUAN, QINGDAI SHANGYE SHEHUI DE GUIZE YU ZHIXU: CONG BEIKE
ZILIAO JIEDU QINGDAI ZHONGGUO SHANGSHI XIGUAN FA (2005) (discussing tablet
engravings of local commercial customs).
172. SUI, supra note 167.
173. Id. at 18–19, 58–59.
174. Id. at 13, 18–19, 30–31.
175. XGDC supra note 170, at 153, 175, 194, 364.
176. THE CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1 (1930).
177. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 28, 30, 40, 67, 79, 84, 132, 141, 153, 157,
175, 194, 257, 291, 349, 418.
178. These were common. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 141, 153, 157, 175,
194, 257, 278, 279, 291. Exceptions include XGDC, supra note 170, at 225, 488, 234,
262 and 547, which allowed redemption at any time, regardless of any contractually
established guaranteed usage period.
179. Deqing County, Zhejiang Province, guaranteed the ability to redeem for only
thirty years, which would still be unimaginably long by the English standards discussed
below in Part IV. XGDC, supra note 170, at 480–81. I can only find two other counties
that imposed a mandatory deadline, both in Gansu Province. Xunhua imposed a three or
five year redemption deadline for all conditional sales. Jingyuan capped the ability to
redeem at sixty years. XGDC, supra note 170, at 684, 695. Numerous other counties in
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to be that redemption rights would exist indefinitely, and could be
exercised in any year after the guaranteed usage period, if one existed.
As a Fujian custom stated, conditional sales of land “could be redeemed
even after several dozen or even several hundred years, and the price of
redemption would always remain the same regardless of changes in land
value.”180 While such extreme language was rare, customs that expressly
made redemption possible “at any time” existed in all reporting provinces,
and were particularly abundant in North China, the Middle and Lower
Yangtze, and South China.181 Many explicitly forbid the original contract
from setting any redemption deadline.182 Most other customs simply stated
that redemption rights could be exercised “anytime after the guaranteedusage period’s expiration.” 183 The assumption seemed to be that no
deadline for redemption would be made, which was indeed the case in
actual practice. As several scholars have observed, the typical Qing dian
contract in most regions would set a period of guaranteed usage, but no
deadline for redemption.184 Quite the opposite, it was common practice
in North China and the Middle and Lower Yangtze for dian contracts to
incorporate some version of the following: “If there is not enough cash
to redeem [after the guaranteed usage period had passed], the buyer will
continue to till the land with no deadline. Once the original amount has
been paid, the land will revert to the original owner.”185 On the other
hand, a very small number of counties did expressly limit indefinite
redeemability to contracts that imposed no clear deadline.186 The contrast is
quite distinct.

Gansu supported unlimited ability to redeem. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 690,
691, 696.
180. XGDC, supra note 170, at 505.
181. A partial list: XGDC, supra note 170, at 28, 29, 67, 81, 225, 234, 262, 319,
356, 364, 370, 488, 505, 524, 547, 570, 586, 600, 631 (dealing explicitly with burial
grounds), 645, 646, 690, 691, 696, 722, 822, 1160.
182. Examples from supra note 181 include XGDC 234, 262, 524, 547.
183. Examples include every custom cited in supra note 181, except those also cited
in supra note 182.
184. LIANG, supra note 148; Isett, supra note 140, at 88. See also the North China
custom discussed at XGDC, supra note 170, at 232 (clarifying that the original owner
could not be compelled to surrender his redemption rights upon the termination of the
guaranteed-usage period).
185. TIANCANG QIYUE WENSHU CUIBIAN (Hugh T. Scogin & Zheng Qing eds.,
2001): nos. 17, 71, 91, 130, 198, 279; XGDC, supra note 170, at 312.
186. I can find only three examples of this: XGDC, supra note 170, at 586, 688,
818.
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Other counties prohibited redemption during guaranteed usage periods
and between sowing and harvest, but made no express statement on
redemption deadlines.187 Some do comment that, if the seller failed to
redeem before sowing time, “he would have to wait until the following
year,” implying that redemption rights were viable for some extended
period of time.188 We can interpret this relative silence either to indicate
an unspoken adherence to the formal Qing law, or simply to mean that
no customary deadline existed. Default adherence to Qing law seems fairly
unlikely. For example, numerous customs expressly prohibited redemption
during guaranteed usage periods189 even though the Qing Code carried
an identical prohibition,190 which would make little sense if default
adherence was assumed. More plausibly, silence on redemption deadlines
simply meant that none existed by custom, especially since the great
majority of contracts, as mentioned above, also decline to impose any
deadline.
All in all, these custom surveys clearly suggest that most local
communities in the Chinese core supported indefinite redeemability.191
A few localities, in fact, went a step further and prohibited permanent
land selling of any kind: even irrevocable sales could be redeemed as
long the original owner still possessed a copy of his original deed.192
Social historians will notice that the widespread existence of indefinite
redeemability customs fit in with cultural perceptions of land in Qing
society. Ownership of land was a “very personal thing” for most Qing
farmers, as it was in many pre-industrial societies.193 Land “shared in
the individual and social nature of the owner.”194
The uniformity of such customs across geographical regions indicates
that the practice had very deep social and historical roots, and had
therefore existed long before the late-Qing custom surveys. Indeed, as
will be discussed shortly, Qing officials had been attempting to limit
rights of redemption since the mid-Qianlong era—a campaign that
Republican governments carried on well into the twentieth century,195
suggesting that such norms were a widespread “problem” by at least the
187. This list is very long. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 141, 153, 157, 175,
194, 257, 278, 279, 291.
188. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 55, 378, 548, 291, 940.
189. See supra note 178.
190. See discussion supra p. 156.
191. The immediate audience of these surveys, Republican lawmakers, would have
agreed with our observations. See discussing surrounding infra notes 256, 257.
192. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 28, 225, 319,.
193. MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 234.
194. Eduard Kroker, The Concept of Property in Chinese Customary Law, 3
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOC’Y OF JAPAN 123, 127–31.
195. See discussion supra pp. 156–59, see also discussion infra p. 164.
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mid-eighteenth century.196 The reluctance of later-Qing magistrates to
enforce these official regulations further confirms this impression.197
The idea that Qing and Republican society favored permanent
landownership ideals has encountered some recent criticism. For
example, based on surveys of provincial homicide cases, Thomas Buoye
claims that Qing landowners often made conditional sales “to raise cash
to invest in trade or business,” and in increasingly “innovative” ways
that “indicated a good deal of commercial savvy.”198 This suggests, he
claims, that the ideal of permanent landownership was in decline. These
observations are not, however, logically inconsistent with the arguments
in this article. Even if landowners became more open to complex
conditional sales, they could nonetheless have assumed that no permanent
loss of land would occur. In fact, customary protection of redemption
rights might actually have encouraged “innovative” conditional sales;
since the risk of permanently losing the land was low, landowners felt
less wary towards such transactions. Oddly, Buoye does not discuss the
content or operation of any actual local custom.
Contrary to our observations in this section, some scholars have argued
that most conditional sale contracts in the Lower Yangtze did contain a
contractual deadline—usually three or five years—for redemption.199
This seems to stem, however, from a misinterpretation of contractual
language. They note, for example, that certain Anhui contracts contained
the clause “can be redeemed after three years,” interpreting this to mean
that the seller must redeem within three years.200 The various sources
examined above, however, make it abundantly clear that such language
almost always meant “cannot redeem within three years,” but says
nothing about redemption deadlines.201
B. The Qing Code and Other Central Regulations
Compared to the seller-friendly tendencies of most local customs,
formal Qing civil law came to exhibit considerable hostility towards the
196.
197.
198.

See supra pp. 28–31.
See discussion supra pp. 159–62; see also discussion infra p. 164.
Thomas Buoye, Litigation, Legitimacy, and Lethal Violence, in CONTRACT AND
PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 94, 106, 113; BUOYE, supra note 159, at 94.
199. Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 130–31; ZHOU YUANLIAN & XIE ZHAOHUA,
QINGDAI ZUDIANZHI YANJIU 312–13 (1986); HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 176.
200. ZHOU & XIE, supra note 199.
201. See discussion supra notes 154, 187, and infra note 206.
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unlimited redemption of conditional sales, although this was a slow and
extended process. Earlier editions of the Qing Code make little mention
of conditional sales. The central statute on this subject was statute 95,
“Conditional Sales of Land or Real Estate” (Dian Mai Tian Zhai), which
sets three rules.202 First, the conditional buyer must register the contract
with local officials and pay the accompanying tax.203 Second, the buyer
must not impede redemption after the guaranteed usage period has passed.
Third, the conditional seller must not sell the contracted land to any other
party before he fully redeemed it. These are, of course, very narrow rules
that fail to address most conditional sales-related complications.
Realizing these inadequacies, the Qing Court issued several addendums
during the eighteenth century. The first, promulgated in 1730, banned
the redemption of sales expressly labeled as “irrevocable sale.” If no such
phrase existed, or if the contract “set a guaranteed usage period,” “then
the property shall be redeemable.”204 In addition, should the conditional
seller eventually decide to irrevocably sell his land to the conditional buyer,
he could henceforth demand only one additional payment.205 Finally,
any attempt by the seller to prematurely redeem before the guaranteed
usage period had expired would carry criminal liability.206
A 1744 addition by Emperor Qianlong attempted to further crack
down on ambiguously worded contracts that failed to specify whether
the sale was redeemable or not, banning redemption of such contracts if
“a long time has already passed.”207 This vague edict paved the path for
a more detailed 1753 sub-statute, which stipulated that any ambiguous
contract made after 1723, but before 1753, could be “redeemed in
accordance with this sub-statute.”208 Ambiguous contracts made before
1723 would, however, be considered irrevocable sales that carried no
possibility of either redemption or additional payment. From 1753
onwards, all new contracts were required to expressly indicate their legal
status, either as a dian or a jue mai, through the phrases “to be redeemed” or
“sold irrevocably, never to be redeemed.”209
202. DA QING LV LI [THE GREAT QING CODE] [hereinafter DQLL] 95.00 (1905).
203. Later edicts effectively voided this rule by granting tax exemptions to dian
contracts. Id. at 95–109.
204. Id. at 95–103.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 14 QING SHILU, at ch. 436 (1985).
208. DQLL, supra note 202, at 95–107.
209. Some scholars have proposed a more ambitious but somewhat less literal
interpretation: the sub-statute meant that any ambiguous contract, whether drawn before
or after 1753, would be presumed redeemable for thirty years. HUANG (2001), supra
note 124, at 74; MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 240–41. The evidence is drawn from a
paper by Kishimito Mio, which records three murder cases from the Xing’an Huilan that
purportedly adjudicated “according to the 30-year rule.” HUANG (2001), supra note 124,
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The Qing Code clearly left a substantial amount of contractual freedom to
private parties. Most importantly, it did not set any absolute maximum
on redemption deadlines or require that contracts specify a deadline. Philip
Huang, for one, considers this lack of regulation a commitment to “a
precommercial ideal of permanence in landholding.”210 A few scholars
have disagreed,211 but the sub-statutes did seem to at least tolerate that
ideal.
While this is certainly a reasonable reading of the Code, the Code itself
hardly presents a comprehensive and accurate view of Qing conditional
sales regulation. Most scholarship in English, with a few exceptions,212
seems to assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that the Code constituted
the only Qing legal authority on conditional sales.213 Chinese and
Japanese scholars have done better in recent decades. Most importantly,
they have given the Board of Finance Regulations (Hubu Zeli) some
well-deserved attention.214 This was a set of regulations issued by the

at 74. None of the three cases expressly applied any such rule. Instead, they simply
ruled that, since the original contracts were ambiguous and too much time had passed,
the land in question was no long redeemable. Kishimito Mio, Ming Qing Shidai de
“Zhaojia Huishu” Wenti, in III-4 ZHONGGUO FAZHISHI KAOZHENG 423, 457–58 (Terada
Hiroaki ed., Zheng Minqin trans., 2003). They do not tell us whether those contracts
were made before or after 1753. There is, therefore, no way to identify the precise
statutory rationale of the judgment. See also Terada Hiroaki, Shindai Chuuki no Ten
Kisei ni Mieru Kigen no Imi ni, in TOUYOU HOSHI NO TANKYUU 339, 347–51 (1987)
(refuting any attempt to apply DQLL, supra, note 202, at 95–107 to post-1753
contracts).
210. HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 74.
211. See, e.g., Buoye, Litigation, Legitimacy, and Lethal Violence: Why County
Courts Failed to Prevent Violent Disputes over Property in Eighteenth-Century China,
in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY 106.
212. Henry McAleavy does not explicitly discuss any other legal authority, but
does, based on the Taiwan Shiho, notice the existence of the crucial “ten year rule” in the
Hubu Zeli, discussed below. McAleavy, supra note 154, at 410–11. Macauley does
recognize the existence of the Hubu Zeli as an alternative source of legal regulation, but
does not mention the “ten year rule.” MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 241.
213. See, e.g., HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 88–89; Buoye, supra note 211.
Neither of the two main essay collections in the Chinese legal history field mentions any
statutory source other than the Qing Code and some scattered edict collections in their
bibliographies. See CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Kathryn Bernhardt &
Philip C.C. Huang eds., 1994); CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA,
supra note 13.
214. See, e.g., Lin Qian & Zhang Jinfan, Hubu Zeli de Falv Shiyong, 5 FAXUE
QIANYAN 197 (2003), available at http://www.legalhistory.com.cn/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=827:n&catid=40:2011-03-05-16-10-18&Itemid=41; 8
ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI 436 (Zhang Jinfan ed., 1999); ZHONGGUO MINFA SHI 60–03
(Kong Qingming, Hu Liuyuan & Sun Jiping eds., 1996); Terada, supra note 209, at 352–60.
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Board of Finance at five-year intervals, beginning in 1776. Since the
Board of Finance’s official duties centered on the administration of land
and tax, these regulations naturally focused on similar issues. By the
end of Qianlong’s reign, they had become crucial parts of the Qing legal
apparatus by and were binding over all levels of government adjudication.215
The Qianlong series of Board of Finance Regulations (Regulations)
made two crucial changes to conditional sales law. First, the Regulations
now allowed the buyer of a dian to sell his conditional ownership,216
upon which the third-party purchaser would assume all the rights and
obligations of the original buyer. Second, and more drastically, if the
conditional seller failed to redeem within eleven years of the original
sale, the conditional buyer could claim full ownership by assuming tax
responsibilities for the property (tou shui guo hu).217 After ten years, the
seller could ask for, at most, a one-year extension, after which redemption
would be at the discretion of the buyer.218 There was one exception:
when bannermen sold land to commoners, they were guaranteed redemption
rights for twenty years.219
Court documents claim that the official legislative intent was to
“eliminate social conflict” and “prevent litigation.”220 Recalling the
widespread protection of indefinite redeemability by local customs, these
somewhat cryptic phrases seem to suggest that the central government
was indeed aware of those customs and, moreover, felt burdened by the
social disputes they frequently generated. Quite possibly, these regulations
amounted to a direct and conscious assault on customary rights of dianredemption.
One might question whether “eliminating social conflict” and “preventing
litigation” really was the main motivation behind these regulations, but
215. Lin & Zhang, supra note 214.
216. 1 QINGDAI GE BUYUAN ZELI: QINDING HUBU ZELI (QIANLONG CHAO)
[hereinafter HBZL] 148 (Fuchi Shuyuan ed., 2004).
217. Id. at 83, 148–49.; ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 435; Terada,
supra note 209, at 357–58. There has been some debate over whether this ten-year limit
was a deadline for redemption or merely an upper limit for guaranteed usage periods—
the language is somewhat ambiguous and could support either interpretation. See GUO
JIAN, DIAN QUAN ZHIDU YUANLIU KAO 196 (2009) (supporting the latter interpretation);
Terada, supra note 209, at 357–58 (supporting a version of the former interpretation, in
which the buyer could terminate the seller’s right of redemption after eleven years, if he
chose to). However, discussions of the rule in imperial memorials, in which officials
pleaded with the Jiaqing Emperor to allow impoverished bannermen to retain redemption
rights after the eleven-year deadline, make it fairly clear that Qing officials, at least,
tended to follow the former interpretation. Lin Qian & Zhang Jinfan, supra note 214 at
§ 3. I see no solid reason to challenge them.
218. ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 435. The buyer did not have to
exercise this claim immediately. Terada, supra note 214, at 357–58.
219. ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 435.
220. Lin & Zhang, supra note 214, at Part 3.
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there is no solid reason to assume otherwise. Qing local government
famously suffered from an extraordinary lack of both financial and
human resources.221 This was at least partially a conscious decision by
the central government. In an attempt to streamline the bureaucracy, the
Qing court made it a general policy to withdraw from direct management of
local economic and social affairs, leaving tax-collection, dispute settlement,
and even limited rulemaking powers to local guilds, lineages, and other
social groups.222 Compared with earlier dynasties, the Qing employed
roughly the same number of local officials despite dealing with a population
that was several times larger.223 “Preventing litigation” was, therefore, a
real and pressing issue.
Combined with the Qing Code, the Board of Finance Regulations put
forth a set of rules that was distinctly intolerant of permanent landownership
ideals. No matter the circumstance or contractual language, conditional
sellers had at most ten (or twenty) years to redeem, and could receive
only one additional payment if they made the sale irrevocable. The
drafters of these rules were quite willing to sacrifice the conditional
seller’s ability to maintain ownership for legal clarity and perhaps
administrative simplicity. This is a drastically different picture than
what the Qing Code offers on its own, and one that has unfortunately
escaped Western academic attention for the most part.

221. The literature is enormous, but this basic observation remains unchallenged.
Two of the more famous works are CH’U TUNG-TSU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA
UNDER THE CH’ING 24–32 (1962); and BRADLEY W. REED, TALONS AND TEETH: COUNTY
CLERKS AND RUNNERS IN THE QING DYNASTY 169–70 (2000), both of which argue that
local magistrates suffered from resource limitations so acute that they had very little
coercive power over local communities.
222. See ROWE, supra note 10, at 32–33. For an overview of the importance of
guilds, see Christine Moll-Murata, Chinese Guilds from the Seventeenth to Twentieth
Centuries: An Overview, in THE RETURN OF THE GUILDS at 213, 213–247 (Jan Lucassen,
Tine De Moor & Jan Luiten van Zanden eds., Int’l. Rev. of Soc. Hist. Ser. No. 16, 2008).
223. The classic statement is HO PING-TI, THE LADDER OF SUCCESS IN IMPERIAL
CHINA; ASPECTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY, 1368–1911 (1962), which calculates the size of
the Song, Ming, and Qing bureaucracies in comparison to their respective populations.
The book’s definition of “social mobility” has been controversial. See the literature
review at F.W. MOTE, IMPERIAL CHINA 900–1600, at 126–34 (2003), and BENJAMIN
ELMAN, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CIVIL EXAMINATIONS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 647–50,
656, 659 (2000), which revises a number of Ho’s claims on social mobility, but largely
confirms his estimates on the overall size of the bureaucracy. For data on population
growth, see discussion at supra note 145.
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C. Local-Level Adjudication
Central regulations possess limited judicial significance until they are
actually enforced through the official resolution of relevant disputes.
Since the Qing Code expressly discouraged the appeal of commonplace
“residency, marriage, or land” (huhun tiantu) disputes, the great majority
of such disputes were handled only by county magistrates.224 Whether
central regulations on conditional sales redemption could indeed supplant
contradictory local customs largely depended, therefore, on the adjudicatory
behavior of these entry-level officials. Here, however, it becomes much
harder to pinpoint relevant original sources. Adjudication is, naturally,
best studied through case records, which generally fall into one of three
categories: first, serious criminal cases compiled by provincial governments
or the imperial court;225 second, privately written casebooks, usually
compiled by retired officials based on their personal adjudication
experience;226 and third, local county archives such as the famous Baxian,
Baodi, and Danxin collections.227
Of these three, the second category is the least useful for our present
purposes. Private collections generally only incorporate cases that, in
the editor’s judgment, possess significant explanatory force or set good
examples for future adjudication.228 As such, they have a strong tendency
to favor technically difficult or morally educational cases over “mundane,”
commonplace ones, which explains why cases focusing on redemption
or additional payment rights almost never make it into these compilations.
This Article uses these compilations only in a complementary role.
The first category—central and provincial level criminal adjudication
records—offers little reliable information on the local adjudication of
land disputes. Since imperial law strongly discouraged the appeal of
huhun tiantu cases to the provincial level unless a strong criminal

224. DQLL, supra note 202, at 334.05.
225. See XINGKE TIBEN (TUDI ZHAIWU LEI); XING’AN HUILAN. For books utilizing
these sources, see BUOYE, supra note 159; DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN
IMPERIAL CHINA (1967).
226. E.g., QIU HUANG, FUPAN LUCUN, in 1 MING QING FAZHI SHILIAO JIKAN 371
(Nat’l Library of China ed., 2008); FAN ZENGXIANG, FANSHAN PIPAN (Shanghai Guangyi
Bookstore ed., 1915); DONG FEI, RUDONG PANYU.
227. Historians have recently discovered a fourth in Nanbu county. Yasuhiko
Karasawa, Bradly W. Reed, & Matthew H. Sommer, Qing County Archives in Sichuan:
An Update from the Field, 26 LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 114 (2005). It remains relatively
unknown in Western academia. Mainland Chinese scholars have fared better. See LI
ZAN, WAN QING ZHOUXIAN SUSONG ZHONG DE SHENDUAN WENTI (2010) (utilizing the
Nanbu archives).
228. See, e.g., QIU, supra note 226, at 375–77.
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element was present,229 provincial and central adjudication focused almost
exclusively on serious crimes. The largest category actually seemed to be
homicide.230 More problematically, Qing law explicitly separated huhun
tiantu disputes from more serious cases not only in the availability of
appeal, but also in the level of discretion that local magistrates enjoyed.
For example, a magistrate could diverge from the prescribed punishments
in the Qing Code for huhun tiantu cases.231 Thus, instead of receiving a
physical beating, the losing side would generally pay damages or obey a
court injunction.232 More importantly, the magistrate could allow huhun
tiantu cases, but not serious criminal charges, to end in informal
mediation.233 We cannot project the adjudication patterns found in
provincial homicide cases onto the processing of ordinary civil cases.
This is especially true of cases where sharp differences existed between
local custom and formal law. In such situations, the magistrate had good
reason to be cautious: enforcing formal law could frequently trigger enough
discontent to damage his personal reputation and local standing, if not
outright threaten his personal safety.234 Assuming that his decision would
probably be unappealable, the prudent move would be to allow mediation,
and thus avoid enforcing a potentially unpopular law. As we will see
shortly, this is exactly what happened in most county archive cases.
This leaves us with the third category: county-level case archives.
There are, as noted above, three major archives that have been employed
in legal history research since the 1980s. Combined, these archives offer
detailed case records of several hundred civil disputes, ranging from the
late-Qianlong era to the early Republican years.235 The archives preserved a
significant percentage of the county’s actual caseload, with no obvious

229. See Jonathan Ocko, I’ll Take It All the Way to Beijing: Capital Appeals in the
Qing, 47 J. ASIAN STUD. 291, 295 (1988) (“[N]o appeals of minor civil cases . . . could
be accepted.”); Qiang Fang, Hot Potatoes: Chinese Complaint Systems from Early Times
to the Late Qing, 68 J. ASIAN STUD. 1105, 1121 (2009) (noting that huhun tiantu cases
could not be appealed beyond the prefecture level).
230. BUOYE, supra note 159, at 1–16.
231. LIBU CHUFEN ZELI, cited in ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at
676–77.
232. Mark Allee, Code Culture, and Custom: Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in
a Nineteenth-Century County Court, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA,
supra note 213, at 122, 126–27.
233. PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE
IN THE QING 119 (1996).
234. See discussion supra notes 221, 222.
235. HUANG, supra note 233, at 239–40.
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sign of institutional or personal filtering. What they offer, then, is an
opportunity to observe local-level adjudication in its original colors. For
our present purposes, these cases are especially valuable because they
occurred after both the Qing Code revisions discussed above and the
issuance of the Board of Finance Regulations, and therefore provide
information on their enforcement.
We focus here on twenty-seven civil disputes related to conditional sales,
of which twenty-six are randomly drawn from county case archives.236
Within these twenty-seven, only nine reached a formal court decision, while
the other eighteen ended through some out-of-court process, usually
community mediation.237 A cursory glance at this ratio suggests a clear
willingness on the magistrate’s behalf to allow mediation. More importantly,
the nine formally adjudicated cases were mostly “easy cases” that did
not involve the more provocative rules in either the Qing Code or the
Board of Finance Regulations. In particular, none involved the issue of
redemption deadlines. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this. In the
first, the Baxian county government had sold land confiscated from a
temple, which was engaged in illegal activities.238 That land, however,
had previously been conditionally sold to several parties, who now
petitioned for repayment. The magistrates determined that they had no
relation to the temple’s crimes and arranged compensation. This case
does not, in fact, involve any legal rule discussed above, but was morally
straightforward. The second case involved a peasant who had conditionally
sold land to another,239 but had later made the sale irrevocable and had
received the additional payment. A few years afterwards, he attempted
to reclaim the land by cutting down its trees for sale. The magistrate
found for the new owner, and no other result was possible unless he
assumed that irrevocable sales could be redeemed.240
236. Baodi Archives [hereinafter Baodi] 194, 1839.2.23; Baodi 96, 1846.95.8;
Baodi 96, 1846.100.6; Baodi 103, 1863.117.27; Baodi 104, 1865.5.22; Baodi 109,
1870.22.8; Baxian Archives [hereinafter Baxian] 6:1:722, 1770.7; Baxian 6:1:739,
1774.8; Baxian 6.1:746, 1775.3; Baxian 6.1:749, 1775.10; Baxian 6:1:761, 1777.3;
Baxian 6:2:1413, 1796.11; Baxian 6:2:1415, 1797.1; Baxian 6.2.1418, 1797.3; Baxian,
6:2:1416, 1797.6; Baxian 6:2:1427, 1797.6; Baxian 6.2:1428, 1797.8; Baxian 6.2:1430,
1797.8; Baxian 6:2:1421, 1807.4; Baxian 6.4:1707, 1851.8; Danxin Archives
[hereinafter Danxin] 23201, 1868.10.23; Danxin 23202, 1873.10.18; Danxin 23205,
1879.2.18; Danxin 23206, 1879.11.6; Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21; Danxin 23209,
1882.3.8; Shen Yanqing, Huaiqing Yigao, in 1 JINDAI ZHONGGUO SHILIAO CONGKAN
525–27 (Shen Yunlong ed., Taibei, Ser. No. 0378, 1966).
237. For the nine formally adjudicated civil disputes, see Baodi 103, 1863.117.27;
Baodi 96, 1846.95.8; Baodi 194, 1839.2.23; Baxian 6:1:722, 1770.7; Baxian 6:2:1413,
1796.11; Baxian 6:2:1415, 1797.1; Baxian, 6:2:1416, 1797.6; Danxin 23206, 1879.11.6;
Danxin 23209, 1882.3.8.
238. Baxian 6:1:722.
239. Baxian 6:2:1415, 1797.1.
240. See also Danxin 23209, 1882.3.8; Baodi 194, 1839.2.23.
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More interestingly, one case actually saw the magistrate explicitly
disobey a Qing Code statute. In a late-eighteenth century Baxian case,
Yang Panlong had conditionally purchased a piece of land from Liu
Hongzhi.241 Some time later, he asked Liu to redeem it. Liu agreed, but
also wanted to sell it outright to a third-party. He therefore proposed to
pay his debt to Yang through the revenue from that third-party sale.
Yang disagreed and brought the case to court, where the magistrate
ordered Liu to proceed with his sale and pay Yang afterwards. This
clearly contradicted Statute 95 of the Code, which, as noted above,242
stated that no land under a conditional sale contract could be sold unless
the seller first redeemed it in full.
On the other hand, no case that potentially involved the mandatory
eleven-year redemption deadline ever reached a formal court decision.
They were instead mediated out-of-court. These account for nine of the
eighteen un-adjudicated cases, most involving an outright attempt to
redeem, others involving a conditional seller claiming “sharecropping
rights” over the transacted land, but all seeing at least eleven years pass
between the original transaction and the suit.243 Several of these
involved attempts to redeem contracts made many decades ago. In an
1865 Baodi case, for example, Zhao Yong sought to redeem land that his
great-grandfather conditionally sold in 1788.244 When the conditional
buyer’s descendant refused, Zhao cut down his wheat. While this would
have been a clear-cut decision for the current owner if the magistrate
enforced the Board of Finance Regulations, he allowed it to end in
mediation, where, as discussed below, the mediator apparently recognized
Zhao’s claim to the land. A Danxin magistrate in charge of a similar

241. Baxian 6:2:1413, 1796.11.
242. See DQLL, supra note 202.
243. Baodi 104, 1865.5.22; Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21; Baxian 6:2:1418, 1797.3;
Yanqing, supra note 235; Baxian 6:1:761, 1777.3; Baxian 6:2:1430, 1797.8; Danxin
23201, 1868.10.23; Danxin 23202, 1873.10.18; Danxin 23205, 1879.2.18. All of these
involve conditional sellers claiming an ownership stake in the transacted land at least ten
years after the original transaction. Apart from these nine redemption-related cases, the
other nine un-adjudicated cases are Baodi 109, 1870.22.8 (involving a price-dispute over
the added value to a piece of conditionally sold land); Baodi 96, 1846.100.6 (involving a
sharecropping agreement over a piece of conditionally sold land); Baxian 6.4:1707,
1851.8 (involving ownership of an ancestral gravesite on a transacted property); Baxian
6:1:739, 1774.8 (likewise); Baxian 6:2:1421, 1807.4 (likewise); Baxian 6:2:1427, 1797.6
(likewise); Baxian 6.1:749, 1775.10 (conditionally selling the same piece of land
multiple times); Baxian 6.2:1428, 1797.8 (likewise); Baxian 6.1:746, 1775.3 (likewise).
244. Baodi 104, 1865.5.22.
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1881 case, involving a conditional sale from 1835, actually went beyond
this.245 While he did not formally issue a decision, he told the grandnephew of the original seller: “the land was conditionally sold by your
granduncle to Su Gong . . . . How can his grandson Su Li refuse to allow
redemption?”246 This magistrate clearly ignored the eleven-year limit on
redemption.
Some cases also involved additional payment claims on top of the
redemption attempts. In another 1797 Baxian case, two brothers attempted
to squeeze further additional payments out of their grandfather’s conditional
sale contract, even though it had become legally irrevocable over thirty
years ago due to the grandfather’s acceptance of an additional payment.247
They returned to the land and, using a familiar tactic, cut down its bamboo,
stating that their ownership interests had yet to terminate, and that they
were reclaiming their rights. This case also went to mediation, but the
case record does not document the mediation result. The other six cases
involving contested redemption offer basically similar fact patterns to
the three described above.248
The general tendencies of local magistrates are fairly apparent. They
tended to leave conditional sales disputes, especially ones that involved
prolonged redemption rights, to mediation, and usually declined to enforce
potentially controversial regulations. While most cases that did reach a
formal decision adhered to the published law—a conclusion reached by
several previous studies,249 a few did not. In some mediated cases, the
magistrate expressly indicated his disagreement with central regulations.
All in all, enforcement of central-level laws and regulations was weak.
To scholars familiar with the existing historiography on Qing local
government, these conclusions are unsurprising. The structural peculiarities
of Qing county bureaucracies are well known. In a system where, as
discussed above, county magistrates had a very limited staff and few
personal acquaintances in the local community, they hardly had the tools
to effectively combat local interest groups or custom.250 Nor would they
have much incentive to. As noted before, most land-related cases were
relatively non-appealable, so deference to local custom would rarely
cause any problem with their superiors. The fact that their administrative
245. Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21.
246. Id.
247. Baxian 6:2:1418, 1797.3.
248. Shen, supra note 236; Baxian 6:1:761, 1777.3; Baxian 6:2:1430, 1797.8;
Danxin 23201, 1868.10.23; Danxin 23202, 1873.10.18; Danxin 23205, 1879.2.18.
249. HUANG, supra note 233, at 17; Buoye, supra note 198, at 99–100. These
conclusions do not contradict our conclusions here, which simply argue that difficult
cases involving a law-custom split were usually left to mediation—the magistrate was
not violating any legal rule by allowing this.
250. See discussion supra pp. 158, 160.
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organization was staffed by locals with deep social connections only
increased their reliance on local goodwill.251
Of course, the mere fact that magistrates tended to leave conditional
sales disputes to informal mediation does not necessarily mean that the
mediations followed local custom, rather than formal law. Of our nine
mediated disputes that potentially involved the ten-year deadline, only
three suggest how the mediation proceedings eventually concluded.
This is too small a sample to generate concrete conclusions on its own,
but can nonetheless offer interesting insights when read together with the
custom surveys examined in Section IV.A. Moreover, since existing
mediation documents are extremely rare, one must make the best of what
is available.
Two such cases have appeared above. The first is the 1881 Danxin
case involving a conditional sale from 1835.252 As noted, the magistrate
issued no verdict, but did observe to the grand-nephew that “the land
was conditionally sold by your granduncle to Su Gong . . . . How can
his grandson Su Li refuse to allow redemption?”253 The case record then
indicates that the dispute was eventually resolved through mediation.
This strongly suggests that the final mediation result allowed redemption,
although potentially with some financial concessions to the buyer’s
grandson. Since the magistrate’s comment was a clear violation of
the Board of Finance Regulations, the motivation for his comments lay
elsewhere, either in his personal sense of equity or a prudent deference
to local custom. The latter motivation works well, of course, for our
argument that dian redemption customs were socially influential, but if
extended redemption rights were actually part of the magistrate’s personal
sense of equity, then perhaps we have underestimated the social importance
of permanent landownership ideals.
The other case, the Zhao Yong incident from Baodi, had a very similar
fact pattern. The record shows that communal mediators took control
and reached a settlement: the original seller’s great-grandson, who had
cut down wheat from the contracted land, could keep the crops, but
would also allow the original buyer’s family to keep using the land.254
The original contract would not, however, be replaced by an irrevocable
deed. While this seems to be a compromise, we must remember that the
251.
252.
253.
254.

REED, supra note 221.
Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21.
Id.
Baodi 104, 1865.5.22.
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original contract was over eighty years old, so any acknowledgement of
the great-grandson’s claim would suggest that the mediators did indeed
consider his right of redemption was still valid. As with all individual
mediation results, we cannot be sure whether the mediators were
consciously following local custom or just trying to make both sides
happy. As argued in Section IV.A., however, local customs in North China,
where Baodi is located, did support indefinite redeemability vigorously.
The concurrence between these customs and the specific outcome in this
case is at least suggestive.
The third case is perhaps the most interesting—it is the only case in
our sample that was not drawn from a county archive, but is nonetheless
included here due to its fascinating fact-pattern. This was an early
nineteenth century case from Jiangxi, found in a magistrate’s private
case collection. It involved an old man attempting to redeem land that
he had sold to his neighbor forty years ago.255 The old man claimed that
the sale was conditional, but the magistrate found that it had actually
become irrevocable some years ago. In any case, the eleven-year
redemption window had long expired for this Jiangxi transaction, and the
old man would have had no legal right to redeem even if the contract
were still conditional. Here, however, the magistrate expressed sympathy
with the old man’s economic plight and informally persuaded the neighbor
to allow redemption. Consciously avoiding formal law, he instead favored
an out-of-court settlement that agreed with local customs.
Ultimately, what limited information we have on mediation results
does indeed show that they tended to agree with local custom, perhaps
with the magistrate’s active encouragement. Moreover, the very fact
that most local conditional sales customs continued to contradict official
law well into the early-twentieth century already constitutes fairly convincing
proof that local enforcement of the ten-year regulatory deadline was
weak. One particularly interesting development in the 1929 Republican
Civil Code was that it extended the mandatory redemption deadline for
conditional sales from eleven years—the Qing rule—to thirty, even
though rural commercialization had increased drastically since the midQing.256 Republican lawmakers might have realized that the ten-year
deadline was simply unenforceable, and therefore made a concession to
local customs.257 Shielded from formal legal pressure by the passiveness

255. Shen, supra note 236.
256. ZHONGHUA MINGUO MINFA DIAN [CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA],
arts. 912, 924 (1929).
257. Philip Huang has interpreted this as a partial rethinking of the “precommercial” logic of rural society. HUANG, supra note 124, at 88–89. As noted above,
however, Huang did not seem to be aware of the ten-year rule in the Hubu Zeli, and
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of county magistrates, these customs regulated conditional sales in most
of China’s economic and cultural “core,” creating a widespread normative
presumption in favor of indefinite redeemability.
V. COMPARISON WITH ENGLISH LAND TRANSACTIONS NORMS
How, then, do these transactional norms compare to English land
transaction institutions? Ultimately, an explanation of the Sino-English
divergence in capitalist agriculture must be an exercise in comparative
legal history. The central issue is not, of course, what the term “conditional
sale” means in English law, but whether we can find a functional
equivalent in sixteenth and seventeenth century English land transaction
norms. When the transition to managerial farms occurred did English
real property norms allow landholders to transact their land for a lump
sum—in essence, use land as security for a monetary loan—while
retaining indefinite rights of redemption at little or no interest? We
argue here that they did not. English law and custom did recognize a
right of redemption for certain transactions, but such rights were only
secure for relatively short periods of time. For example, local customs
often mandated a one-year redemption period for mortgages. Thus,
redemption windows were generally quite limited and, moreover, were
enforced with extraordinary rigor until the late seventeenth century. This
created a transaction system that was perhaps cleaner and less disputeprone than Qing conditional sales, but also much harsher on the conveyor.
One preliminary issue that haunts any study of English property rights
is the status of copyhold land—land technically owned by the lord of the
manor, but then rented out to tenants. More precisely, were the rules for
copyhold transaction substantively different from those governing the
transaction of freehold land? Fourteenth century copyholders were
transacting and conveying their land in roughly the same ways as a
freehold tenant, and by the later sixteenth century any major normative
difference on this issue had largely vanished.258 The main differences
therefore conceivably interpreted the Republican rule as less tolerant of redemption than
Qing laws.
258. See generally ERIC KERRIDGE, AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY AND AFTER 32–93 (1969) (arguing that, by the sixteenth century, copyhold and
freehold were effectively equivalent for most legal questions); J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 348–50 (3d ed. 1990); S.F.C. MILSOM,
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 165 (2d ed., 1981) (“[The] copyhold
[by the early Seventeenth Century] . . . had equal protection . . . .”).
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were that copyholds could only change hands through a “surrender and
admittance” in the lord’s court, but this was predominantly a formality.259
Otherwise, copyhold conveyances employed conditions, limitations,
remainders, trusts and mortgages just like freeholds.260 These were
nominally governed by local customs, but the distinction between custom
and law on these issues had begun to blur as early as the fourteenth century,
when royal courts began to enforce “reasonable” customs,261 and had
certainly become rather insignificant in our era of interest (ca. 1500–
1700). Courts of equity had recognized copyhold claims well before the
reign of Henry VIII, and, by at least the sixteenth century, even the
sluggish common law courts had caught up, applying common law rules
to copyholds via writs of trespass.262
Moreover, common law rules on real property had possessed deep
customary roots ever since their creation in the twelfth century. Instead
of imposing a foreign system, they generally attempted to reinforce
manorial custom, which was actually quite uniform across different
geographical regions.263 While custom differed from the common law in
issues such as fines and services to the lord, it recognized the same
modes of transaction and applied similar rules.264 Indeed, when legal
treatises discussed the rules of medieval land conveyance, they drew
freely from customary sources. 265 Although the distinction between
copyhold and freehold was undoubtedly important in some circumstances
—when, for example, the copyholder wished to sue his lord—it did not
259. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
371 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1776); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND
LAW 170 (2d ed., 1986).
260. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 258, at 350 (discussing conditional and limited
remainders in copyhold); SIMPSON, supra note 259 (“[Mortgages] could be used for both
freehold and leasehold property . . . .”); University of Nottingham, Copyhold Land,
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsi
ndepth/copyhold/copyhold.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009) (noting that copyholds could
be “bought and sold, inherited by descendents, left in a will, mortgaged, and settled, just
like freehold estates.”).
261. Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 26, 28–30,
32–33 (1988).
262. WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 7 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 306 (2d ed., 1937)
(“[T]he grants made by the copyholder were subject to the ordinary rules of law.”);
CHARLES MONTGOMERY GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON LAW 23–34, 54–
66 (1963).
263. S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976);
Kiralfy, supra note 261, at 28–29 (“In principle the custom of each manor was separate,
but obviously the basic principles would be similar though adapted to local geography
and conditions.”).
264. ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 95 (1966).
265. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 156 n.q.; HENRY DE BRACTON, 2 DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 69 (Samuel Thorne trans., 1970), available at
http://hlsl5.law.harvard.edu/bracton/ (discussing the law of lay assizes).
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seem to substantively affect the basic rules and categories of conveyance
by the sixteenth century.266 Since this Article examines both legal and
customary norms, there is little need to maintain a rigid separation of
copyhold and freehold tenure throughout the following analysis.
Section V.A surveys the main categories of revertible land transactions—
fees “upon condition” and “upon limitation,” and considers their
comparability with Chinese conditional sales. Section V.B hones in on
the most comparable subcategory, mortgages, and carefully examines
the legal and customary regimes that regulated mortgage redemption.
Section V.C then examines some statutory transactions that bear some
resemblance to conditional sales.
A. Narrowing the Range of Inquiry
To students of modern Anglo-American law, the default example of a
land transaction that allows redemption is, of course, the mortgage. In
the “classic” English mortgage, which existed from the fifteenth century
to the early twentieth century,267 the mortgagor conveyed ownership
rights to the mortgagee, but retained rights of redemption until a fixed
date.268 Other forms of “mortgages” or “gages” had been in use since
Anglo-Saxon times, but followed similar principles. Much of the following
discussion will, therefore, compare English mortgages to Chinese
conditional sales.
A preliminary question to consider is, however, whether to focus
exclusively on mortgages. In English legal history, the idea that a landed
estate could be cut short and “revert” back to the original conveyor was
certainly not exclusive to mortgages. As early as Bracton’s time, a
conveyance could be “conditional,” the conveyor would have a reversion
if some specified condition—generally if the receiver failed to have heirs
of his body—was satisfied.269 By Blackstone’s time, jurists had broken
down such transactions into further subcategories: a conditional conveyance

266. See KERRIDGE, supra note 258.
267. The “classic” mortgage was prevalent by the fifteenth century. See THOMAS
DE LITTLETON, LITTLETON’S TENURES IN ENGLISH § 332 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., 1903).
This mortgage remained largely predominant until 1925 with the passing of the Law of
Property Act. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1925/20/pdfs/ukpga_19250020_en.pdf.
268. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 155.
269. BRACTON, supra note 265, at 71–83.
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could either be “upon condition” or “upon limitation.”270 The former
gives the conditional conveyor an option of retrieving the property,
while the latter simply returns ownership automatically.
The “classic” English mortgage outlined above was “subject to a
condition”: the mortgagor could choose to terminate the mortgagee’s
ownership upon timely payment of debt.271 The condition for reversion
here was, of course, timely repayment. The question we must ask, however,
is whether all conveyances that could revert after repayment—in other
words, allowed redemption—were necessarily mortgages. If not, then
we cannot limit our inquiry to mortgages. A deeper look into the medieval
roots and definition of mortgages suggests, however, that such concerns
are largely unnecessary.
In their earliest form, mortgages were not conditional conveyances at
all. The term “conveyance” implies that some transfer of formal title,
whether in fee simple, for a term of years, for life, or via lease, has occurred,
but in Glanvill’s time (circa 1180) no such transfer accompanied the
establishment of a “gage”—broadly defined as a landed security for
debt.272 Instead, the “gagor” simply put the “gagee” in possession of the
transacted land without giving him any formal right to it.273 Glanvill
separated gages into “living gages” (vivum vadium) and “dead gages”
(mortuum vadium, or “mortgages”). In “living gages,” the transacted land’s
annual yield counted towards the gagor’s debt as long as the gagee was
in possession, whereas in “dead gages” it did not.274
The problem with these antique gages is, naturally, the gagee’s lack of
either legal or customary title. Judges in both royal and local courts
found it difficult to determine to what, exactly, the gagee was entitled.275
Theoretically speaking, he had no legal claim to the gaged land, and was
only entitled to recover his debt.276 In practice, however, the judges
were often unable to compel monetary repayment, and thus could only
offer relief through compelling formal and permanent conveyance.277
How they justified such conveyance remains somewhat ambiguous, but
later jurists correctly point out that they must have attempted to invent
270.
271.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 154–55.
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 123 (1968); HOLDSWORTH, supra note
262, at 375.
272. RANULF DE GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI
ANGLIAE X. 6–12 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965).
273. Id. at x. 8.
274. These concepts had Roman roots. See H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage
Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1890).
275. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 271, at 121.
276. GLANVILL, supra note 272, at x. 11.
277. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 271, at 121.
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some kind of new and imaginary estate category to accommodate gages.278
Not until the fifteenth century did the “classic” mortgage finally replace
these archaic forms. 279 Since mortgages and conditional conveyances
had been quite unrelated up until this point, their legal merger required a
number of conceptual modifications. Mortgages were now conveyances
of either full ownership or for a long term-of-years—generally over 100
years.280 These mortgages could be redeemed at any time prior to the
deadline, which was usually six months to a year after the initial
transaction.281 In the latter case, the right of redemption did not
terminate upon the end of the term-of-years, but upon default of debt,
which, of course, was not nearly as distant into the future. Upon default,
either the full ownership would become free from future reversion, or the
long term-of-years would “swell” into full ownership.282
On the other hand, the legal concept of conditional conveyance also
required tinkering so that it recognized a new kind of condition for
reversion: that reversion would become possible upon repayment of
debt, that is, upon redemption. In Bracton’s time, conditional conveyances
consisted of three subcategories: those that depended “on the donee,” those
that depended on some third party, and those that were “fortuitous.”283
Noticeably missing from this framework were conditional conveyances
that reverted upon some action by the conveyor—redemption, for example.
Jurists needed, therefore, to expand the concept of “conditional conveyance”
before it could logically accommodate mortgages, and had largely
succeeded by Blackstone’s time.284 We must remember, however, that the
emergence of active redemption as a recognized legal condition directly
reflected the need to formalize mortgages. It would be odd, therefore, if
we could find a redeemable conditional conveyance that was somehow
not a mortgage.

278. Id.
279. See discussion supra note 267.
280. See Bamfield v. Bamford (1675), 73 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY
183; BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 157–58; SIMPSON, supra note 259, at 242–43.
281. See discussion supra p. 161.
282. See the discussion at LITTLETON, supra note 267, at §§ 216–18.
283. BRACTON, supra note 265, at 71–72. An example of a valid condition for
reversion would be if the “donee” (or conveyee) failed to possess “heirs of his body.”
See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 271, at 18. Additionally, another valid condition
for reversion would be if he alienated his land to men of religion, or even if he alienated
the land at all. See MILSOM, supra note 257, at 173–75.
284. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 155.
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The definition of “mortgage” after the fifteenth century further confirms
this impression. A “mortgage,” whether at law or at custom, was simply
“any arrangement whereby a loan was secured by a conveyance of real
property.”285 Because any redeemable conveyance of land was, theoretically,
a secured debt—and vice versa, the concept of “mortgage” was broad
enough to incorporate all transactions that involved active redemption.
The diverse legal forms that a mortgage could assume only emphasized
the broad scope of its basic concept. A mortgage might well be a
conditional conveyance or a long term-of-years, but it did not necessarily
attach itself to any particular form of legal estate. Instead, it embodied a
fundamental “intent”—to secure debt through conveyance of land—that
could take any one of several legal shapes.286 Indeed, we find this broad
definition of “mortgage” in fifteenth century legal authorities, and it
remained predominant until at least the late nineteenth century,287 even
though mortgages had been firmly and almost exclusively bound to
conditional conveyances for centuries by then. Finally, a basic survey of
the main legal sources for the sixteenth and seventeenth century, including
the English Law Reports and the Publications of the Selden Society, does
not reveal any case or custom where a redeemable conditional conveyance,
whether “upon condition” or “upon limitation,” was classified as anything
but a mortgage.288 All in all, the various developments and legal authorities
examined above strongly suggest that mortgages were the only recognized
instruments of transaction in common law, equity, or custom that contained
an express right of redemption.
B. Mortgages
The issue, therefore, is whether English mortgages and Chinese
conditional sales were different enough to have affected the extent of
managerial farming. As should be apparent by now, the two had much
in common: they both involved the conveyance of land in exchange for a
lump sum, and both imbue the conveyor with certain rights of redemption.
285. BAKER, supra note 258, at 353. For similar statements from earlier jurists, see
Seton v. Slade, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ch.); 7 Ves. 265; Mortgagees Legal Cost Act,
1895, 58 & 59 Victoria c.25 (Eng.); and W.F. BEDDOES, A CONCISE TREATISE OF THE
LAW OF MORTGAGE 2–5 (2d ed. 1908).
286. SIMPSON, supra note 259, at 242.
287. See supra note 267.
288. E.g., Manning v. Burges, (1663) 22 Eng. Rep. 678; 1 Ch. Ca. 29; Roscarrick v.
Barton, (1672) 22 Eng. Rep. 769; 1 Ch. Ca. 216. The customs are mainly found in 18
PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY (1904), and 21 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN
SOCIETY (1906). See especially Collier v. Walters (1873), L.R. 17 Eq. 252, which
considered whether a determinable fee (a conditional conveyance upon limitation) that
reverted upon repayment of debt was valid. Judge Jessel determined that “there is not
any authority to be found” for any such limitation, and ruled it void. Id. at 261.
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Of course, these are what make the two instruments comparable in the
first place. Moving on to the details, however, we find differences of
varying importance.
Those familiar with modern mortgages will probably notice rather
obvious differences in the distribution of possession rights. In modern
English and American mortgages, the mortgagee generally does not
possess the transacted land until default,289 whereas Chinese conditional
sales allowed the buyer to maintain possession until redemption. This
distinction, if true, would be economically significant. A conditional
sales buyer who exercised his right of possession would, until conversion
into an irrevocable sale, have little incentive to either improve the land
or utilize it as a source of long-term capital. A mortgagor who retained
possession, however, could more or less control his own destiny, and
would therefore have greater incentive to improve the land.
Unfortunately, this institutional difference only emerged in modern
times. The basic theory of English mortgages underwent significant
revisions in the Law of Property Act 1925.290 This law attempted to fit
all mortgages into a uniform “lien theory,” giving the mortgagee a power
of foreclosure upon default but refusing him pre-foreclosure possession.291
In contrast, the classic English mortgage discussed above conveyed
ownership rights to the mortgagee, whether for a long term-of-years or
for full ownership, and theoretically allowed the mortgagee to take
immediate possession unless the contract expressly covenanted otherwise.292
Mortgagees would often decline possession in actual practice,293 but the
normative framework was no different from Chinese conditional sales.
It is true that late-seventeenth century courts began to actively discourage
pre-foreclosure mortgagee possession,294 but the widespread creation of
managerial farms had started much earlier.

289. Lien theory mortgages, established in England by the Law of Property Act,
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.20 (Eng.), give the mortgagee no title to the land until
foreclosure. For a brief summary of American mortgage law, see DAVID A. SCHMUDDE,
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 7 (2004).
290. Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.20 (Eng.).
291. Id.
292. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 158–59.
293. Id. at 159.
294. They did this by “calling the mortgagee very strictly to account, not only for
all rents and profits actually received, but for all rents and profits which ought with due
diligence to have been received.” Bucks v. Gayer, (1684) 23 Eng. Rep. 453 (Ch.); 1
Vern. 258; Blacklock v. Barnes, (1725) 25 Eng. Rep. 218 (Ch.); Sel. Cas. T. King 53.
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The primary institutional difference between Chinese conditional sales
and English mortgages lies, ultimately, in the regulation of redemption
deadlines and default. Whereas conditional sales customs, as we
have emphasized above, usually guaranteed the seller an indefinitely
viable right of redemption, the notions of limited redeemability and
default had been central to English mortgages since at least the fifteenth
century. By the time Littleton wrote his treatise on tenures, he described
mortgages as a conveyance “upon such condition, that if the [mortgagor]
pay to the [mortgagee] at a certain day, [for example], 40 l. of money,
that then the [mortgagor] may reenter.”295 This basic format remained
virtually unchanged for at least three centuries. Thus, Blackstone could
claim that a mortgage is where “a man borrows of another a specific
sum . . . and grants him an estate in fee, on condition that if [he]
shall repay the mortgagee the said sum . . . on a certain day mentioned
in the deed, that then the mortgagor may [reclaim the land].”296 The
“living gage” that we discuss above does allow for the possibility of
indefinite redeemability, but it was an extremely archaic form that only
Glanvill mentions.297
We can assume, then, that early modern English mortgages generally
—probably universally—carried deadlines for redemption. There was
no law that prevented a mortgage contract from stating “this deed shall
be forever redeemable,” but no normative authority ever acknowledges
this possibility. Moreover, we know that sixteenth and seventeenth
century mortgages generally gave one-year redemption periods, with
few exceptions. Collections of mortgage contracts at, for example, the
University of Nottingham demonstrate remarkable homogeneity in this
regard.298 But what about contracts that, whether purposely or not,
failed to state an express deadline? By the nineteenth century, courts
would regularly apply default redemption deadlines in such cases: any
use of the term “as mortgagor” would automatically imply a half-year
See also R.W. Turner, The English Mortgage of Land as a Security, 20 VA. L. REV. 729,
730 (1934).
295. LITTLETON, supra note 267 (emphasis added).
296. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 158 (emphasis added).
297. See supra discussion surrounding note 273. See, however, the discussion of
statutory transaction instruments in Part IV.C—some of these instruments resembled
living gages in their mechanisms, but, as they were created by statute and largely limited
to urban merchants, cannot be considered continuations.
298. Mortgage by Demise, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, http://www.nottingham.ac.
uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsindepth/mortgaged/demise.
aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (“The date for repayment is usually given as one year
from the date of the mortgage.”); Mortgage by Conveyance, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM,
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsi
ndepth/mortgaged/conveyance.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (“The date for
repayment is usually given as one year from the date of the mortgage.”).
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redemption period unless expressly made otherwise.299 Scholars have
suggested that the rule had origins in the seventeenth century.300
If we backtrack a little to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and
search surviving customs records, we do indeed find numerous customs
that mandated one-year redemption periods. For example, in the customs
compilations of the Selden Society, many localities that have preserved
their medieval mortgage customs report a mandatory one-year redemption
period.301 There is, in fact, good reason to suspect that such customs
were quite prevalent throughout the late medieval and early modern
periods. The striking uniformity of sixteenth and seventeenth century
mortgage contracts in this regard strongly suggest the existence of some
underlying normative force. It would otherwise be very difficult to
understand why most contracts converged onto a one-year time frame,
which, by this time, would be just as random as any other schedule. All
in all, the existing evidence strongly suggests that one-year redemption
periods had deep roots in historical practice, and that they were a common
customary norm in the early modern period. It is hardly inconceivable
that increasing commercialization of land persuaded courts to shorten
this norm to half-a-year by the nineteenth century.
Redemption deadlines meant very little, of course, if courts refused to
enforce them, but lack of enforcement was probably not an issue in preeighteenth century England. Common law courts, in particular, were
notoriously harsh in enforcing default provisions. As legal historians
have long noticed, the date for repayment was strictly adhered to at
common law.302 Once it passed, the mortgagee would theoretically have
an absolute right of exclusion against the mortgagor, even if the amount
of the loan were less than the land’s full market value.303 The harshness
of this rule is remarkable especially from a comparative perspective. In
the event of permanent alienation, Chinese conditional sales customs

299. Turner, supra note 294, at 736; see also BEDDOES, supra note 285, at 1.
300. Turner suggests that it may have originated in the later seventeenth or early
eighteenth century. Turner, supra note 294, at 731.
301. See the customs at 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 143, 145, 147,
193 (1904).
302. Wade’s Case, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 232 (C.P.); 5 Co. Rep. 114a; BLACKSTONE,
supra note 259, at 158; BAKER, supra note 258, at 355; David Sugarman & Ronnie
Warrington, Land law, citizenship, and the invention of “Englishness”: The Strange
World of the Equity of Redemption, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 111,
113 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995).
303. See sources supra note 302.
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would compel the buyer to provide the seller with “additional payments,”
and thereby pay him the land’s full market value.304
Until the late seventeenth century, however, the common law rule of
strict default was undoubtedly the highest mortgage redemption norm in
England. How frequently mortgagees actually utilized this rule is less
clear. Many mortgagees were probably willing to grant repayment
extensions, if for no other reason than to accumulate more interest.305 On
the other hand, given the high level of concern over strict default in later
seventeenth century equity courts,306 we can safely assume that a substantial
number of mortgagees did successfully exercise these exclusion rights.
Since this paper focuses on institutional comparisons, it focuses more
about whether people could exercise these rights than how many of them
actually chose to.
Some local customs treated defaulting mortgagors more leniently than
common law norms, but only marginally. In the medieval customs of
one Lancashire borough, for example, default did not give the mortgagee
an immediate right of possession, but rather a right of sale.307 A
mortgagee must sell the land for its full value, take what is owed to him,
and return the rest to the mortgagor. The rule did not, however, prohibit
the mortgagee himself from being the purchaser,308 and so he could
potentially pay the difference to the mortgagor and then assume full
ownership. For our purposes, however, whether the mortgagee himself
purchases the land is of little consequence. The central point is that
default would lead swiftly to permanent alienation from the mortgagor,
whether to the mortgagee or to some other buyer. In the larger scheme
of things, this arrangement might actually have been more economically
efficient than simply transferring ownership to the mortgagee.
The customs of Romney, in Kent, were more complicated.309 The
Selden Society records preserve two sets of customs for this locality, one
from the mid-fourteenth century, the other from the late-fifteenth.
Mortgage redemption customs remained largely stable between these
eras.310 Once default occurred, the mortgagee would come to the local
court and demand repayment. The court would then publish this request
for eight days and, should the mortgagor fail to redeem, convey full

304. See discussion supra p. 151.
305. For a survey of foreclosure and debt practices among high-income groups, see
Christopher Clay, Property Settlements, Financial Provision for the Family, and Sale of
Land by the Greater Landowners, 1660–1790, 21 J. BRIT. STUD. 18 (1981).
306. See discussion supra p. 172.
307. 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 143 (1904).
308. Id.
309. 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 144–46.
310. Id.
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ownership to the mortgagee. If, however, the full value of the land
exceeded the mortgagor’s debt, the mortgagee would pay the difference.
Other mortgage redemption customs in the Selden Society records
resemble one or both of the above. They generally guaranteed mortgagors
the full value of their land, while also providing for permanent alienation —
if the mortgagee demanded immediate satisfaction—within a few weeks
of default.311 By any measure, these customs were more accommodating
to the mortgagor than the common law rule, but nonetheless gave the
redemption deadline significant normative weight. Since, as mentioned
above, most customs also mandated “year-and-a-day” redemption periods,
it was virtually impossible for English mortgages to mutate into the
century-long affairs that Chinese conditional sales frequently became,
unless it somehow made sense for the mortgagee.
Probably not until the later seventeenth century did any English court
substantially interfere with contractual redemption deadlines. In 1654,
the Court of Chancery outlined, for the first time, “the equity of
redemption.”312 By the mid-eighteenth century, there was a fixed format
for this. As a matter of equity, default of payment gave the mortgagee
not an absolute right of ownership, but only a right of foreclosure. This
meant an action of foreclosure in court, where the judge decided whether
to compel immediate satisfaction or to extend the redemption period for
a “reasonable time,”313 usually ranging from six months to two years.314
Once the extension expired, the mortgagor could then obtain a decree of
absolute foreclosure. Alternatively, the mortgagee could exercise a
power of sale immediately after the first default, but could not purchase
the land himself.315
Despite the equity of redemption’s eventual legal importance, it has
little significance for our present inquiry. As noted above, English
agriculture had become largely managerial by 1700, meaning that tenantdriven land accumulation took off well before that. The equity of
redemption, however, was not firmly established until the eighteenth
311. Apart from the customs discussed above, see also 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE
SELDEN SOCIETY 143–44, 147, 192–93, 289. The longest extension is found on page 289,
which gave roughly one month—between Michaelmas and All Saints Day.
312. Duchess of Hamilton v. Countess of Dirlton, (1654) 21 Eng. Rep. 539; 1
Chancery Reports 165.
313. Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 302, at 113; Sheldon Tefft, The Myth of
Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 576–78 (1937).
314. Tefft, supra note 313.
315. Id. at 580–81; BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 159.
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century, 316 and therefore had very little impact on the process of
accumulation. Although the first decision appeared in 1654, Chancery
was split for the rest of the seventeenth century, with Nottingham in
favor of equitable redemption and North against. In, for example, the 1681
case of Newcombe v. Bonham, North refused to allow equitable redemption,
reversing Nottingham’s earlier decision and ordering immediate
alienation.317 Meanwhile, common law courts adhered to their strict
default rules until at least 1672.318 All in all, courts of equity played no
significant role in easing mortgage redemption until well after the takeoff of
managerial farming. Within our period of interest, common law and
customary norms probably predominated and, as demonstrated above,
usually provided for strictly enforced one-year redemption periods.
C. Other Transactional Instruments
Apart from these more “organic” forms of land transaction, English
law also recognized a number of statutory transaction forms. These
were generally created by royal decree to meet certain economic needs.
Two of these forms, the statute merchant and the statute staple,319 were
somewhat similar to mortgages. They are “securities for debts . . .
whereby the lands of the debtor are conveyed to the creditor, till out of
the rents and profits of them his debt may be satisfied: and during such
time . . . he is tenant by statute merchant or statute staple.”320 Unlike
mortgages, these did not carry a fixed deadline for redemption. They
were not, however, freely available to most landowners. Since these
instruments were created by statutory decree,321 the state maintained
tight control over their procedural application. The transacting parties
needed to appear before the mayor of an authorized “staple,” of which
there were only a few in England, and register their agreement.322
Moreover, prior to 1532, they were only available to registered traders.323
Finally, one can conceive of two legal fictions that might allow a
landowner to “borrow” money via reversible conveyance of land, but
avoid formal categorization as a mortgage. The first would be a term-ofyears conveyance that was then rented back to the conveyor. For
316. E.g., Burgess v. Wheate, (1759) 96 Eng. Rep. 67; 1 Black. W. 123 (K.B.).
317. Newcomb v. Bonham, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 266; 1 Vern 7 (Ch.).
318. Roscarrick v. Barton, (1672) 22 Eng. Rep. 769; 1 Ch. Cas. 216.
319. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 160; see also A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF ASSUMPSIT 87–88, 126–35 (1975).
320. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 160.
321. The Statute of Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.); 1353, 27 Edw. 3 st. 2, c.9
(Eng.).
322. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 160.
323. 1531, 23 Hen. 8 c.6 (Eng.).
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example, the conveyance would be for thirty years at £300, with yearly
rent set at £12. This effectively created a £300 loan, repayable in thirty
years with £60 of interest. The potentially extended (but not indefinite)
repayment schedule does resemble Qing conditional sales to a limited
extent, but the other aspects of this transaction are far more burdensome
to the conveyor. Without the purchaser’s consent, he could not regain
ownership either sooner or later than the fixed term—if repayment could
cut short the term-of-years, the transaction would become a mortgage
and therefore subject to the same rules. A second option might be to
“lease” land for a nominal rent, but require a large security deposit. The
“landlord” could then regain possession via repayment of the deposit.
Since, however, the “tenant” could terminate the lease at will, the “landlord”
would be under even greater pressure to repay than a usual mortgagor.
In any case, as early modern legal treatises and cases contain very few, if
any, instances of these transactions, one may reasonably suspect that
they had little socioeconomic importance.
Ultimately, English law and custom do not seem to recognize any
mode of land transaction that was both redeemable for indefinite periods
and easily available to the general population. To most landowners, the
mortgage was probably the only practically accessible transaction that
contained a right of redemption—but of a fundamentally different quality
than what we find in Chinese customs. The difference between an
indefinitely viable right of redemption and a strictly-enforced deadline,
usually for a year, is simply enormous. This, then, is the institutional
distinction we wish to draw between Chinese and English norms of land
transaction. The remainder of this paper will consider its effects on land
accumulation and the scale of agricultural production.
VI. TESTING A NEW EXPLANATION
The institutional differences between Chinese conditional sales
and English mortgages—more specifically, the difference between an
indefinite right of interest-free redemption and a one-year redemption
window—had enormous impact on patterns of land ownership and
transaction. English norms were, first of all, much more likely to create
permanent alienation. Scholars have persuasively demonstrated, in fact,
that mortgage foreclosure and debt repayment accounted for enormous
amounts of permanent land acquisitions in sixteenth and seventeenth
century England, usually by richer farmers from their less fortunate
neighbors, and therefore in favor of managerial farming over the long
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run.324 The evidence from China, as discussed below, points in the
opposite direction.
Second, indefinite redeemability creates a highly different set of
incentives for landowners who need to sell land. It allows landowners to
“sell” their land for a substantial sum without risking their permanent
ownership, which intuitively made irrevocable sales both unnecessary
and suboptimal in most situations. As a large number of social studies
on both Qing and early modern English society have argued, the great
majority of land-sellers, even those that were very wealthy, did so out of
raw necessity, usually to meet an immediate expense or pay off a
pressing debt.325 Landowners in both societies were highly hesitant to
part with their property and, when forced to do so, generally hoped to
retain redemption rights for as long as possible.326 Thus, when given the
choice between a permanent transaction and an indefinitely redeemable
“conditional sale” that did not accrue interest, we would expect a
significant majority to choose the latter, as long as it brought enough money
to cover immediate needs. In comparison, the English mortgagor who
had a year to redeem was in a much more perilous position, making the
choice between a permanent transaction and a mortgage much less obvious.
The general preference for conditional sales over permanent sales
could, in fact, exist even in a society where most people used land as a
freely transact-able investment tool, and did not sell it merely to cover
needs. As long as people anticipated rising land prices—certainly a
valid assumption given increasing commercialization, land (not labor)
productivity and rent levels in most of the Qing and Republic327—a
324. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 15; Clay, supra note 305. C.f. Sugarman &
Warrington, supra note 302.
325. For the Qing, see, e.g., HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 73; HUANG (1990),
supra note 24, at 106; MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 230; Madeleine Zelin, The Rights
of Tenants in Mid-Qing Sichuan: A Study of Land-Related Lawsuits in the Baxian
Archives, 45 J. ASIAN STUD. 499, 515 (1986). Qing officials generally assumed that
conditional sales were done out of a pressing and unavoidable need for cash. See Lin
Qian & Zhang Jinfan, supra note 214, at part 3. For England, see Sugarman &
Warrington, supra note 302.
326. This explains why social demand for the equity of redemption was so high in
late-seventeenth century England. See Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 302.
327. On the existence and growth of markets for agricultural produce throughout
the early to mid-Qing, see supra note 11. After the mid-nineteenth century, exposure to
foreign trade further boosted market integration levels. See, e.g., THOMAS G. RAWSKI,
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PREWAR CHINA (1989) (attributing early-twentieth century growth
to market integration driven by the foreign presence); LILLIAN M. LI, CHINA’S SILK
TRADE: TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY IN THE MODERN WORLD, 1842–1937 (1981) (positively
assessing the impact of foreign trade on silk production); ROBERT PAUL GARDELLA,
HARVESTING MOUNTAINS: FUJIAN AND THE CHINA TEA TRADE, 1757–1937 (1994)
(discussing the growth of the tea trade after the mid-Qing). On growing land
productivity, see Philip C.C. Huang, Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century
Britain and China?, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 501, 512 (2002) (arguing that land productivity
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conditional sale would allow the seller to wait for long-term value
increases while still obtaining a substantial lump sum immediately.
There simply was very little downside in choosing a conditional sale
over a permanent one.
This suggests the following explanation for China’s relative lack of
managerial farming: The availability of conditional sales in Chinese
society made landowners less willing to engage in permanent transactions.
Moreover, the eventual probability of permanent alienation in a conditional
sale was much lower than in an English mortgage. Combined, these
factors made permanent land accumulation difficult and slow—too slow,
in fact, for the widespread buildup of managerial farms. If, however,
affluent peasants attempted to create managerial farms upon conditionallyowned land, they would have had to shoulder the risk that land redemption,
which was beyond their control, could swiftly lead to the farms’
disintegration. It was not, therefore, that managerial farms were harder
to create in China, but rather that they fell apart more easily. Over the
long run, this prevented managerial farms from occupying a more
prominent place in Chinese agriculture.
The prospect of redemption also might have impeded the creation of
managerial farms by deterring capital investments in land. The
productivity advantage of at least some Qing managerial farms came
from the fact that they could coordinate certain capital investments more
efficiently than household-size farms—Chinese agriculture may not have
been capital intensive, but it certainly was not capital free. In particular,
irrigation, the use of roads, the creation of raised banks for fruit trees,
and the long-term maintenance of fertilizer were all more efficient on
managerial farms.328 Other forms of long-term capital investment include
tools or animals that worked better on larger farms.329 Since these all
involved making permanent or semi-permanent investments, farmers might
hesitate to pursue them on conditionally-held land that could be redeemed at
any time. In fact, several scholars would argue that permanent capital
increased despite declining labor productivity). On increasing pressure from landlords to
increase rent-levels throughout the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see KATHRYN
BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: THE LOWER YANGTZE REGION,
1840–1950 (1992).
328. For North China, see JING SU & LUO LUN, QINGDAI SHANDONG JINGYING
DIZHU JINGJI YANJIU 130–41 (1984); HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 139. For the
Lower Yangtze, see LI BOZHONG, supra note 11, at 62–68.
329. Farm animals were indeed used more efficiently on larger farms. See discussion
supra p. 143.
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investments were one of the main reasons why managerial farms enjoyed
higher productivity, and therefore to remove them would be to lose the
point of managerial farming.330 The validity of this argument depends
on whether these capital investments were cheap enough, relative to
labor, to merit widespread use in Qing China. If they were, then it would
indeed make little sense to create a managerial farm on conditionallyheld land. If they were not,331 then affluent peasants could conceivably
choose to create a labor-intensive managerial farm through conditional
purchases. The problem there, as we have noted in the previous paragraph,
would be that the purchases could be redeemed—and the farm
disintegrated.
Under this latter scenario, we would expect to find that, first,
enterprising Chinese peasants who wished to purchase land usually had
to rely on conditional sales; second, conditional sellers generally protected
their redemption rights and rarely agreed to permanent alienation; and,
third, obtaining permanent ownership of land was therefore highly
difficult. This would be fundamentally different from the situation in
early modern England, where, as noted above, the combination of
irrevocable sales and fixed-term mortgages generated a steady stream of
permanent conveyances from poor peasants into the hands of managerial
farmers.332
The remainder of this article attempts to test these three hypotheses
against economic data. The second hypothesis has already been discussed
in some detail above. The tension and drama contained even in our
small sample of cases suggest, however crudely, that people took
redemption rights seriously. We do know that they fought over these
rights so frequently—by some estimates, this one issue might have
accounted for six percent of local civil litigation333—that the Qing Court
attempted to “reduce litigation” by imposing mandatory ten-year
deadlines.334 Its failure to do so only highlights the importance of dian
redemption to local communities. Quantitative data is rare, but what
limited information we possess has led at least some scholars to argue
that conditional sales were common, whereas permanent alienation of
land was rare.335 For example, around 10% of arable land in a North

330. JING & LUO, supra note 328, at 130–41; LI BOZHONG, supra note 11, at 62–68.
331. A number of scholars have argued this point. See supra note 104.
332. See supra notes 128, 129, 324.
333. WU, supra note 151, at 114. Existing surveys of local gazetteers have likewise
confirmed that sellers protected their customary redemption rights jealously, and that this
was a frequent source of social negotiation and tension since at least the mid-Qing.
MACAULEY, supra note 158.
334. See supra Part III.b.
335. NAGANO, supra note 140, at 121–23.
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China county was under conditional sale when Buck arrived with his
survey team, while perhaps 5% of land in several Lower Yangtze counties
permanently changed hands over a generation.336 This latter figure
includes not only land that became irrevocable after a conditional sale,
but also outright permanent transactions.
The first hypothesis is also easily confirmed. Historians have known
for some time that conditional sales were by far the most important
means of transacting land in Qing and Republican China. The Japanese
survey data cited in the previous paragraph speaks clearly to this effect.
Moreover, virtually every scholar who has studied mainland Chinese
contract archives confirms that conditional sales outnumber irrevocable
ones by a significant margin: Yang Guozhen and Cao Xingsui have done
this for Fujian and the Lower Yangtze, while Philip Huang has made
similar claims about North China.337 As noted above, this makes good
sense if conditional sales usually generated enough money to cover
immediate financial needs, which they probably did. By most indications,
conditional sales in North China commanded around 70% of the land’s
full market value, while their counterparts in the Lower Yangtze and
South China could command up to 80%.338 For most landowners who
needed to finance an upcoming wedding, funeral, or some other
contingency, conditional sales probably met their needs just as well as a
full-value but irrevocable sale.339
336. Id.
337. Yang, supra note 158, at 31; CAO XINGSUI, JIU ZHONGGUO SUNAN NONGJIA
JINGJI YANJIU 31 (1996); HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 106.
338. HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 176; McAleavy, supra note 154, at 406;
MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 231.
339. These studies of land contracts also provide information on the socioeconomic
identity of conditional sellers and buyers. The general impression is that poorer farmers
sold land more frequently to make ends meet, but large landlords, too, conditionally sold
land with some frequency. Loren Brandt & Barbara Sands, Land Concentration and
Income Distribution in Republican China, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 11, at 179, 185. On the purchaser side, the most active players seemed to
have been relatively well-off peasants who probably employed some wage labor. We
have, for example, relatively detailed survey information on transactions in Qingyuan
County, Hebei between 1934 and 1936. See Zhang Peigang, Qingyuan de Nongjia
Jingji, 7 SHEHUI KEXUE ZAZHI 1 (1936); Shi Zhihong, 20 Shiji San Sishi Niandai Huabei
Pingyuan Nongcun de Tudi Fenpei ji Qi Bianhua, 3 ZHONGGUO JINGJISHI YANJIU 3
(2002). Over 60% of buyers in these transactions were either “middle farmers” or “rich
farmers.” See Zhang Peigang, supra, at 8, 16, and data at Shi Zhihong, supra, at 5–6.
The survey suggests that “middle farmer” households tilled, on average, around 27 mu,
while the average “rich farmer” household managed around 90 mu. Shi Zhihong, supra,
at 5–6. Given that the average nineteenth century North China household could only
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This leaves the third hypothesis, that permanent land purchasing was
highly difficult. In this particular aspect, our proposed explanation shares
considerable common ground with existing theories of Chinese land
inalienability, which, as discussed above, suggested that lineage first
purchase rights posed inefficient obstacles to free alienability.340 Their
other empirical problems aside, they, too, sought to demonstrate that the
market for permanent transactions was too small. The actual volume of
permanent land transactions in any Chinese regional economy is, however,
nearly impossible to estimate. To make a reasonably useful calculation,
we must measure both the size and the frequency of permanent transactions.
Whereas we can find scattered local data on the former,341 the latter
remains largely a mystery. The Communist government did attempt to
measure the frequency of both conditional sales and permanent alienations
in Baoding between 1930 and 1957, but provides reliable statistical data
for only one village: Gushang, in Qingyuan County.342 The frequency of
permanent alienations there fluctuated wildly between forty-four
transactions in 1935 to only eight in 1936. The number of conditional
sales is only measured for 1930 and 1936, but for both years they were
nearly twice as high as permanent transactions.343 In any case, the small
survey sample and the lack of statistical consistency make it impossible
to reliably project these figures onto even the provincial level. Other
piecemeal Republican-era surveys suggest that, within the permanent
landholdings of an average Lower Yangtze household, only a miniscule
percentage, perhaps 5%, had been bought instead of inherited.344 This
would support our thesis very nicely, but once again, the limited reach of
the surveys does not inspire confidence.
Some scholars have attempted to compensate for the lack of frequency
figures by emphasizing that the vast majority of transactions were small.345
This is undoubtedly true, but its usefulness is limited without reliable
data on frequency. Another issue is how to interpret the size of transactions.
They were small in absolute terms, with a North China average of perhaps 5

farm 20–30 mu without outside help, see HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 70, it would
be unsurprising if most land-purchasing “middle farmers” and all “rich farmers”
employed some wage labor.
340. See discussion supra pp. 147–48.
341. See discussion infra note 345.
342. Shi Zhihong, supra note 339, at 4, 14.
343. Compare id. at tbl.19, with id. at tbl.22 (as Shi observes on p.14, data on land
transactions is only available for Gushang village. We can assume, therefore, that the
data in both table 19 and table 22 come from this one village).
344. NAGANO, supra note 140, at 122–23.
345. See, e.g., MAZUMDAR, supra note 24, at 231–33.
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mu (0.85 acres) and a Lower Yangtze average of 3 mu,346 but so was the
average Chinese farm. If we remember that the great majority of North
China farms were below 25 mu, and that most Lower Yangtze farms did
not exceed 10 mu, then these figures seem much more substantial. All
in all, these figures mean very little until we have better evidence on who
sold how much at what frequency. This seems unlikely for the foreseeable
future.
If a direct measurement of transaction volume remains elusive for
now, is there any way to compensate? One solution is to take a harder
look at landholding patterns. If landowners purchased real property in
patterns that were clearly disadvantageous to them, then it seems reasonable
to assume that obtaining permanent rights to land was highly difficult,
and that the demand for permanent transactions often outpaced supply.
Somewhat predictably, we only have decent information on the landholding
patterns of large landlords, but these are nonetheless suggestive: Lower
Yangtze landlords very rarely possessed large and contiguous tracts of
land, instead owning a large number of tiny patches dispersed over several
counties. For example, a Guangxu era landlord in Yuanhe owned several
hundred segregated plots in forty different polders, while a Pinghu
landlord living in the later Qianlong era owned numerous unconnected
parcels spread out over 60 percent of the county.347 Likewise, in 1903,
the Zhang family of Zhe County, Southern Anhui, owned sixty-three
unconnected plots spread over ten different villages, none larger than 3
mu.348 We can also measure this from a different angle—according to
Mantetsu surveys, over 80% of arable land in one 1940 Shanghai village
was owned by eighty different outsiders, each possessing an average
346. In the Gushang survey, the average transaction between 1930 and 1936, before
the Japanese invasion triggered massive social upheaval, was around 5 mu. Shi Zhihong,
supra note 339, at 14. This seems to agree with other sources from North China, which
all indicate that the vast majority of permanent transactions were between 1 and 10 mu.
6 IWANAMI SHOTEN, CHUGOKU NOSON KANKO CHOSA 406–20 (Committee for the
Publication of the Rural Customs and Practices of China ed. 1958); JING & LUO, supra
note 328, at 65–68, 98–102. Private contract collections from the Lower Yangtze
suggest that most permanent transactions were somewhat smaller, usually between 0.5
and 5 mu. KATHRYN BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: THE
LOWER YANGTZE REGION, 1840–1950 17 (1992); See also contracts from Anhui,
Zhejiang and Jiangsu. TIAN, supra note 185, at nos. 1–17, 19–21, 23–26, 99, 138, 239,
240, 244, 275, 471, 506, 587, 928.
347. BERNHARDT, supra note 346.
348. TIAN, supra note 185, at no. 908. See also supra note 345 (discussing how
Hong Ruoci’s 95 purchases can be separated into at least 17 unconnected plots, each no
larger than 7–8 mu).
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of 6 mu. 349 Small wonder, then, that large landowners in the Lower
Yangtze often became absentee landlords instead of managerial
farmers350—their land was so scattered that they had no choice.
Tenancy was, of course, somewhat less prevalent in North China, but
the existing data still suggests that large landlords in Hebei and Shandong
rented out more land than they managed themselves: roughly 17% of
total arable land fell into the former category, compared with 10-15% in
the latter.351 Within this 17%, holdings were apparently just as scattered
as they were in the Lower Yangtze. The Meng family of Jiujun, for
example, rented out 600 mu to at least ninety tenant families, generally
in separated plots spread across four or five villages.352
It is hard to imagine why any landlord would have preferred to scatter
his holdings to such an extent. It made rent collection and account
keeping exceedingly difficult and, moreover, severely limited the landlord’s
economic flexibility: renting out large and consolidated bundles to rich
tenants, which would have provided greater rent security, was rarely
possible. Some landlords may have wished to geographically diversify
their holdings to safeguard against natural disasters, but this hardly justifies
the extreme dispersion we find in both North China and the Lower
Yangtze. It might have made more sense to own medium-size parcels in
a handful of villages than to own one big plot, but further intra-village or
intra-polder separation into numerous tiny parcels probably provided no
additional ecological security. Most villages, especially in the Lower
Yangtze, were small and consolidated enough to ensure that its various
segments experienced similar ecological conditions.353
Chinese landowners were also notoriously unwilling to pay official
land and property taxes, so could the scattering of holdings simply have
been a tax evasion technique? Lower Yangtze landlords, in particular,
were known for registering their holdings in hundreds of small parcels,
each under a different name, to confuse tax collectors,354 but that hardly
justifies actually breaking up one’s holdings into hundreds of tiny,
unconnected plots—which is what we see here. What really confuses
the tax collector is the registration of land under different names, but that
can occur with or without actual segregation of land. This latter action
does very little to aid the former, and would simply add to logistical
349. This survey is described at HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 107.
350. See supra p. 146.
351. The 17% figure is calculated based on Esherick, supra note 65, at 397. The
10–15% figure has been discussed above in the text surrounding notes 68–74.
352. JING & LUO, supra note 328, at 98–102.
353. See HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 21–43.
354. MADELEINE ZELIN, THE MAGISTRATE’S TAEL: RATIONALIZING FISCAL REFORM IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CH’ING CHINA 245 (1992).
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confusion. All things considered, the severe scattering of landlord property
was probably not by choice, which suggests that even the largest
landlords found it highly difficult to permanently purchase real property.
Since the supply of permanent transactions was very low, potential
purchasers could not afford to be as selective as they would have ideally
preferred.
We have thus far confirmed, to the extent possible, all three hypotheses
laid out above, strongly suggesting that the existence of conditional sales
was indeed a major limiting factor on the creation of managerial farms.
Compared to preexisting inalienability theories that emphasize lineage
first-purchase rights, our proposed explanation highlights the different
incentives in English and Chinese land markets, rather than the different
restrictions. Its empirical advantages should be fairly obvious by now,
but one point deserves particular mention. As discussed in Part Two,
Pomeranz has pointed out that labor input-per-mu figures in both North
China and the Lower Yangtze were fairly consistent between and within
different size-classes,355 which runs contrary to statistical projections
based on traditional inalienability theories. General stability in labor input
makes excellent sense, however, in our conditional sales-based explanation:
relatively easy access to conditional sales meant that farmers could
efficiently adjust their landholdings to accommodate short-term fluctuations
in household labor supply—but also that, due to the interminability of
redemption rights, such adjustments often failed to accumulate over the
long run. Thus, labor input ratios could remain relatively stable even while
redemption activity kept the overall concentration of farmland at much
lower levels than we find in early modern England.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for a property rights-based approach to the
Sino-English divergence in agricultural production. Whereas harsh rules
on mortgage redemption and conditional fee reversion facilitated the
tenant-driven creation of managerial farms in sixteenth and seventeenth
century England, the existence of infinitely redeemable conditional sales
in Qing and Republican China diminished landowners’ incentive to
permanently sell land and, thereby, obstructed the creation of managerial
farms. The “problem” with Chinese property norms, therefore, was not

355.

See discussion supra p. 148.
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that it was too rigid, but rather that it was too flexible and accommodating
towards sellers. This may well have generated important benefits for
social stability and cohesion, but, over the long run, did lead Chinese
agriculture onto a fundamentally different path than English agriculture.
Logically speaking, this Article is only the start of a larger project.
Whereas conditional sales were probably the institutional impetus that
diverted Chinese agriculture away from managerial farming, the creation
and social embracement of this institution suggest that deeper cultural
currents were at work: Did Chinese society possess a stronger commitment
to permanent landownership than English society, or was it that English
society valued free alienability and normative simplicity more highly? If
so, then why? For now, at least, it makes sense to first clarify and organize
our understanding of conditional sales and mortgages—they were, at
least, the institutional mechanisms that these cultural undercurrents operated
through, but a thorough account of “the great agricultural divergence,”
if we may call it that, will eventually require further probing into these
deeper socio-cultural issues.
While there is clearly no space here to address these issues seriously,
it may be worthwhile to throw out some hypotheses. I suspect that the
institutional distinctions between Chinese conditional sales and English
mortgages had less to do with broad cultural perceptions and attitudes
towards landed property than with the different allocations of social
status, prestige and power in Chinese and English rural communities.
Poorer households in Chinese localities enjoyed relatively greater social
bargaining power than in England, and were better able to protect their
socioeconomic interests in the creation and maintenance of local customs.
In the context of conditional sales, this meant giving stronger protection
to “sellers,” who were usually significantly poorer than “buyers,”356 by
granting them strong rights of redemption. The balance of social power
in English communities, on the other hand, favored wealthier households,
and therefore more often mortgagees than mortgagors.
Chinese kin networks, I suspect, tended to allocate social authority
based on kinship ties and seniority. In crude terms, under a culture
influenced by Neo-Confucian ideals, people were encouraged to respect
the opinions and interests of relatives, more than those of non-relatives,
and to respect elder relatives more than junior ones. There were, of course,
other important factors that influenced one’s status and reputation,
including wealth and political ties, but I suspect that they were unable to
drown out the effect of kinship ties and seniority. Moreover, kinship
closeness often did not correlate with economic similarity—Chinese kin

356.
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networks were expansive, even in North China.357 Given that the economic
fortunes of the average household could fluctuate quite drastically within
a generation or two,358 richer households usually had a fair number of
poor relatives. The correlation between wealth and seniority is, of course,
even weaker. It was quite possible, therefore, to obtain decent status and
authority within certain circles even if one was poor—although, of course,
possessing wealth made it easier.
In comparison, while more recent scholarship has come to question the
usefulness of “class” in describing English social structures, preferring
instead terms such as the “middling sort,” it nonetheless tends to agree
that social status correlated rather strongly with wealth—even if wealth
was not the only, or even the dominant, determinant of status.359 Wealth
was, at least, usually a necessary precondition of higher status and authority.
In addition, most scholars now agree that early modern English
communities rarely possessed powerful and expansive kin networks, and
that the individual household was the primary unit of social activity.360
All in all, assuming that my hypothesis about the allocation of status and
authority within Chinese kin networks is largely correct, poor Chinese
rural households probably enjoyed substantively higher social bargaining
power than their English peers. The fact that Chinese customs on
conditional sales redemption were more accommodating towards poorer
households than English mortgage customs conceivably reflected this
bargaining power disparity. These contentions are, of course, strictly
hypothetical, but a detailed study of rural Chinese land disputes and
social structures will probably be able to verify them.
Further research on the institutional comparisons we examine here
should be of interest not only to historians, but also to law and
economics theorists in general. As noted in the Introduction, property
rights scholars have long debated whether local communities tend to
create economically efficient social norms. One influential argument is

357. See Myron Cohen, Lineage Organization in North China, 49 J. OF ASIAN STUD.
509 (1990).
358. Lavely & Wong, supra note 140.
359. See, e.g., KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580–1680, at 43 (2003); H.R.
French, Social Status, Localism and the ‘Middle Sort of People’ in England, 1620–1750,
166 PAST AND PRESENT 66, 77–86, 93 (2000).
360. H.R. French & Richard Hoyle, English Individualism Refuted and Reasserted:
the Case of Earls Colne (Essex), 1550–1750, 56 ECON. HIST. REV. 595, 595–96 (2003);
David Cressy, Kinship and Kin Interaction in Early Modern England, 113 PAST AND
PRESENT 38, 41 (1986).
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that closely-knit communities will usually create economically efficient
norms through internal negotiation and communication.361 They achieve
this, Robert Ellickson argues, by developing a “market of norms.” When a
community faces new socioeconomic conditions, community members
with superior knowledge of cost-benefit conditions or internal communal
dynamics will supply competing norm “candidates” to the entire group,
from which the group then rationally chooses the most meritorious
norm.362 In contrast, other scholars have circulated more pessimistic
views of social norm creation, arguing that norms are not consistently
created as thoughtful, measured responses to changing conditions, but
more often represent the equilibrium outcomes of selfish bargaining or
signaling processes.363 There is, therefore, no guarantee that these outcomes
will advance overall communal utility.
The institutional and economic comparisons explored in this Article
provide a historically significant case study for this debate. Although
Chinese rural communities were probably no less closely-knit than
English ones—if not more so—due to the existence of powerful kin
networks, the conditional sales customs they created had strongly
negative economic consequences over the long run. Ironically, the Qing
government’s attempts at imposing a ten-year deadline on conditional
sales redemption, had they succeeded, would probably have given the
creation of managerial farms a much-needed shot in the arm. All this
seems to agree more with the pessimists than the optimists, but their full
theoretical implications remain unclear until we study the norm creation
mechanisms at work here in greater detail.
Finally, this Article focused on the agricultural divergence between
China and Western Europe, without fully addressing the general SinoEnglish economic divergence, which covers a range of non-agricultural

361. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY
249–58 (1990); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant:
A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224–26 (1994).
362. Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 1
(2001).
363. E RIC A. P OSNER , L AW AND S OCIAL N ORMS (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. P A . L. R EV . 1697 (1996); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338
(1997). See also David Chamy, Illusions of Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in
Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1848 (1996) (arguing that normmaking suffers from the same inefficiencies that plague legislation). In fact, one can find
the seeds of such pessimism as early as Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), and NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 3, which famously
considered pre-sixteenth century English commons to be economically inefficient and in
need of state intervention to establish private property rights.

198

ZHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 13: 129, 2011]

1/31/2012 9:28 AM

Property Rights
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

developments including industrial growth and trade.364 Managerial
farms did enjoy higher agricultural productivity, but, as noted in the
Introduction, whether this can explain Europe’s industrial and
manufacturing advantage remains a complex matter of great contention.
The precise scale and significance of the productivity boost is one issue,
but one must also consider the effects of managerial farming on overall
labor mobility, proto-industrial concentration of capital, and so on.365
Limitations in length and time have prevented this article from tackling
the full divergence question, but it is, in the end, what gives the agricultural
divergence examined here much of its historical significance. For this
particular Article, the relative lack of managerial farming in China is an
end-point, something that needs to be explained. Within the broader
literature on China’s relative decline, on the other hand, it is one of several
starting points. This Article does, at least, demonstrate that laws and
institutions are highly important to any serious study of Chinese or
English economic history—but perhaps in less obvious ways than many
scholars have previously assumed.366 Chinese and English property rights
shared broad similarities in terms of private ownership and alienability,
but, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details.

364. WRIGLEY, supra note 3.
365. See discussion supra pp. 159–62; see also discussion infra p. 164.
366. Some have used the example of China’s recent economic boom to argue that
traditional Western notions of “private property” may not be necessary for robust
economic growth. See Upham, supra note 1; Clarke, supra note 1. A closer inspection
of their arguments suggests that these scholars are arguing that we need to change our
idea of what constitutes an efficient property rights regime, not that “property rights do
not matter.” Our arguments here agree with this sentiment.
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